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PROGRAMS FOR IMPROVING FOREIGN JUDGMENT ENFORCEMENT
IN NEW YORK: THE UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT*
BARBARA KULzER**
INTRODUCTION
The most obvious weakness in the current American methods of
securing full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of other states
and federal districts is the utterly useless requirement that a formal
action must be brought -upon a judgment or decree for money. Such
an action adds nothing to the binding force of the judgment. The
courts of the state where the judgment is sued upon cannot escape
recognition of its validity, so that the suit is only a procedural device
to bring it before the court for execution.1
If such parochial limitations serve any good purpose in modem
society, I do not know what they are.2
T HE above quotations are intended not so much as supporting authority for
adoption of the particular programs for improvement which are the sub-
ject of this article, but serve to illustrate the longstanding recognition of the
need for reform.3 The two Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Acts
respond, in different ways, to the recognized need for a more efficient and less
costly method than that historically offered by the common law. To enforce his
judgment in another state, whether it be a sister state judgment or a foreign
country judgment,4 a judgment creditor must bring a new action on the judg-
* This article was prepared as a study for the judicial Conference of the State of New
York upon recommendations of the Committee to Advise and Consult with the Judicial
Conference on the CPLR. It is published in similar form in the Thirteenth Annual Report
of the Judicial Conference 248 (1967) and is republished here with the permission of the
Judicial Conference to which acknowledgement is gratefully made.
The author wishes to express her gratitude to the members of the Committee to Advise
and Consult with the Judicial Conference on the CPLR, and especially to the Chairman,
Professor Adolf Homburger, and to all who have commented on the study, as it appeared
in the Thirteenth Annual Report. Their suggestions and criticisms have been most helpful,
and many of these are referred to in this article. Particularly useful were the detailed com-
ments of Professor Ruth B. Ginsburg, of Rutgers Law School, Newark and Mr. Bernard
J. Reverdin, of the New York Bar. The author is, of course, solely responsible for the article's
contents.
** Assistant Professor Law, Rutgers School of Law, Camden; BA., University of
Pennsylvania, 1961; LL.B., Rutgers School of Law, Newark, 1964; LL.M., Columbia Law
School, 1967.
1. Report of the Standing Committee of jurisprudence and Law Reform, 52 A.BA.
Rep. 292 (1927).
2. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 Colum.
L. Rev. 1, 21 (1945), quoted in Leflar, The New Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, 24 N.Y.U.
L.Q. 336, 343 (1949).
3. With respect to enforcement of foreign judgments, it has been said that this country
is far behind other countries with federations of states similar to the United States. Leflar,
supra note 2, at 343-45. For a comparison of enforcement techniques in English and Ameri-
can law, with a history of each country's law on the subject and an analysis of the (British]
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933, see Yntema, The Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 -Mich. L. Rev. 1129 (1935).
4. "Foreign judgments," as used in this report, encompasses all judgments entitled to
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ment. Such a suit is a new and independent action, not ancillary to the original
suit between the parties. Nor is it merely a proceeding in aid of execution of
the judgment rendered in the original action.
Several attempts have been made to streamline the prevailing procedures.0
Since 1948, 28 U.S.C. Section 1967 has afforded to judgment creditors in federal
actions a registration procedure, to enforce final judgments "for the recovery of
money or property."7 This succeeded to an abortive proposal to include a similar
provision in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 The same year, the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act was published.9 It offers a summary judg-
ment procedure but was revised in 1964 to provide instead a registration proce-
dure similar to, but more detailed than, the federal act.10 All of these acts are
intended to benefit judgment creditors entitled to recover under judgments from
courts within the United States. However, the National Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws contemplate that their original enforcement act is to be avail-
able to judgment creditors holding foreign nation judgments entitled to be
recognized under the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act."
Originally eight states adopted the 1948 Act. 12 Since the Revision was pub-
lished, two of these, Wyoming and Wisconsin, have repealed the original Act
and enacted the Revision.'8 Pennsylvania also has recently adopted the later
version.14 Oklahoma has been considering adoption of one of the Acts to en-
hance the effect of the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act.' 5
This article has five parts. The first is a brief review of present practice in
New York pertaining to foreign judgment enforcement. The second summarizes
the history of the Uniform Acts and the influence of the federal registration
procedure for district court judgments. The next two parts will analyze the 1948
and 1964 versions respectively. The last is devoted to recommendations and
conclusions. For convenience, both Acts are set out in an appendix.
full faith and credit, and where so indicated, foreign country judgments meeting domestic
standards for recognition.
5. 2 Moore, Federal Practice, f 1.04[21 (1965).
6. Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion is derived from Leflar, supra note 2.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1964), hereinafter referred to as section 1963.
8. Discussions of the background of the federal registration procedure may be found
in 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § S (Wright ed., 1960); 2 Moore,
Federal Practice ff 1.04[21 (1965); and Note, Registration of Federal Judgments, 42 Iowa
L. Rev. 285 (1957).
9. 9A ULA. 474 (1965).
10. 9A UL.A. 486 (1965).
11. 9B ULA. 63, 67 (1966).
12. Arkansas, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyo-
ming. See 9A U.L.A. 474.
13. Wisconsin's act is found at Wis. Stat. Ann. § 270.96 (1968 Cum. Supp.); Wyoming's
is at 2 Wy. Stat. Ann. § 1.477.1 (1967 Cum. Supp.).
14. 9A U.A. 53 (1967 Supp.); 12 Pa. Stat. § 921-7 (1965).
15. See Merrill, Oklahoma and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
on Uniform State Laws, 1965, 36 Okla. B. J. 2205, 2210 (1965).
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PART I
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in New York
Under the traditional common law procedure, there is no particular ma-
chinery for the enforcement of foreign judgments.' 6 Generally, the judgment
creditor brings a new action on his judgment under whatever system of pleadings
exists in the forum.17 The pleadings will put in issue the validity of the judg-
ment, which is determined by the standards of the second state. If such stan-
dards have been codified, the relevant legislation, such as the Uniform Foreign
Money Judgments Recognition Act, will be applied insofar as it is relevant. If
the action on the foreign judgment terminates favorably to the plaintiff, the
judgment rendered is in all respects a judgment of the forum, and whatever
modes of execution are available for domestic judgments may then be invoked.' 8
A full scale trial need not be endured by the parties in New York. The old
Civil Practice Act summary judgment provisions were available for liquidated
claims upon which no valid defense was interposed, and many sister state judg-
ments were enforced through this method.' 9 It was applicable also to foreign
country judgments.20 Now the process may in many cases be shortened by tak-
ing advantage of the summary judgments provisions of the Civil Practice Law
and Rules 21
The relevant sections and rules of the CPLR have consolidated and im-
proved former methods. Three kinds of foreign judgments are of interest here,
two of which, the federal district court and sister state judgments, would be cov-
ered by either of the Uniform Acts as presently drafted.22 If foreign country
judgments are to benefit, an amendment would probably be desirable, if not
necessary. In any event, a review of the pertinent CPLR provisions will take
into account all three kinds of judgments.
The only section of the CPLR specifically governing actions on judgments
is limited to "money judgment[s] entered in a court of the state."23 Any judg-
ment rendered by any court outside of New York must be sued upon to be
docketed and enforced here.24 However, judgments of federal courts from dis-
tricts outside of the state may be docketed and become enforceable by either of
two methods. The judgment creditor may file a certified copy of the judgment
in a United States district court in New York under section 1963, and there-
after file a transcript of the judgment so registered in the office of the clerk of
16. Yntema, supra note 3 at 1136.
17. Id.
18. Id. On modes of execution, see Reisenfeld, Collection of Money Judgments in
American Law-A Historical Inventory and a Prospectus, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 155 (1957).
19. Yntema, supra note 3, at 1136-37 and n.10.
20. Id.
21. Hereinafter referred to as N.Y. CPLR or CPLR.
22. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign judgments Act, § 1(a) (1948); Revised 1964 Act,
§ 1.
23. N.Y. CPLR § 5014.
24. 5 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice ff 5014.01 (1966).
55
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any county of New York State under CPLR section 5018(b)u2 Alternatively,
the judgment creditor may bring an action to enforce the federal district court
judgment in New York.26
The holders of sister state or foreign country judgments presently have but
one choice. They must bring an action on the judgment. However, it is clear that
they may move for summary judgment after issue has been joined under Rule
3212. If the holder of an out-of-state federal district court judgment elected to
bring an action on his judgment instead of proceeding under his first alternative
above, he too could take advantage of Rule 3212.27
There is a more efficient method of reducing a foreign judgment to a domes-
tic one, but it does not yet seem to have been attempted. Section 3213 of the
CPLR permits the motion for summary judgment to be made in lieu of a com-
plaint:
When an action is based upon a judgment or instrument for the
payment of money only, the plaintiff may serve with the summons a
notice of motion for summary judgment and the supporting papers
in lieu of a complaint. The summons served with such motion papers
shall require the defendant to submit answering papers on the motion
within the time provided in the notice of motion. * 4 *
The section then deals with the times within which the papers must be served.
Its last sentence reads: "If the motion is denied, the moving and answering
papers shall be deemed the complaint and answer, respectively, unless the court
orders otherwise.128
This is an °entirely new section which has no counterpart in the former
motion practice. It is "designed to provide for the speedy determination of these
limited actions where the formality of a complaint and answer would serve no
good purpose." 29 Unfortunately for the purposes of this article, most of the
litigants who have taken advantage of it have been holders of notes. There are
no reported cases involving foreign judgments of any type. However, it is un-
reasonable to suppose that it was inserted in the CPLR to facilitate only those
limited instances in which an action can be brought on a domestic judgment
under section 5014.
There is no clear judicial interpretation of the effect of the section even
with respect to domestic judgments. In the one case in which the holder of a
judgment moved under section 3213, the court found it unnecessary even to
25. Section 5018(b) provides:
A transcript of the judgment of a court of the United States rendered or filed
within the state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any county and upon such
filing the clerk shall docket the judgment in the same manner and with the same
effect as a judgment entered in the supreme court within the county.
26. United States v. Pearson, 258 F. Supp. 686, 690-91 (SJD.N.Y. 1966).
27. Rule 3212 provides, inter alia, that "Except as provided in subdivision (d) with
respect to a matrimonial action, any party may move for summary judgment in any action,
after issue has been joined." (Emphasis added).
28. N.Y. CPLR § 3213.
29. McEneney, Motion Practice Under the CPLR, 9 N.Y.L.F. 317, 332 (1963).
56
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reach the question whether the reference to a judgment is restricted to one di-
recting only the payment of money in a certain sum. Indeed, it is not even
stated whether a foreign or a New York judgment was involved. The case,
National Kitchens Inc. v. Central R. R. Co. of New Jersey,30 was decided on
the ground that the judgment on which the plaintiff relied, whatever its origin,
made no direct determination on the issues now tendered.
Some questions raised by section 3213 have, however, been decided in ac-
tions on instruments which would be relevant if a motion for summary judg-
ment in lieu of complaint were served in an action on a foreign judgment. A
court may grant summary judgment only for the amount due on the note or
judgment 8 ' (assuming the question left unanswered in National Kitchens is
settled in the affirmative). Moreover, the supporting papers must contain proof
of the essentials of the plaintiff's cause of action. Omission of such proof pre-
cludes the granting of summary judgment, although if the errors are amendable
irregularities and do not reach the stature of jurisdictional defects, and the de-
fendant is neither misled nor prejudiced, leave may be granted to renew the
motion upon the proper papers.3 2 Where withdrawal of the motion is by stipu-
lation, rather than by its denial, it has been said that the affidavit does not
become the complaint.83 This was decided upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground that a prior action was pending between the same parties on the same
cause. The prior action had begun under section 3213 and was withdrawn by the
stipulation already mentioned. The second court stayed its own action "pending
disposition of the action" in the first court.
Whatever New York method the judgment creditor elects (and it should
be noted here that the holder of a federal district court judgment can proceed
under the federal act only if his judgment is for money or the recovery of
property, and that it is at least arguable that section 3213 applies only to judg-
ments for money), he will have to face the problem of obtaining jurisdiction
over the defendant. The federal judgment creditor, proceeding by way of sec-
tion 1963, on the other hand, is not even required to give notice to the defen-
dant or to the first court of the registration.
3 4
An action on a judgment, like an action on the original cause, requires
that all of the strictures of due process be observed. Jurisdiction, therefore,
must be obtained, whether the action is upon a foreign judgment or upon a
domestic one under section 5014 of the CPLR. As to the latter, it is said:
A problem that occasionally confronts the plaintiff in an action
on a judgment is that the judgment debtor no longer is amenable to
process within the State. Since the judgment is not a res but evidence
30. 25 A.D.2d 506, 268 N.Y.S.2d 960 (lst Dep't 1966).
31. Paul v. Weiss, 48 Misc. 2d 683, 265 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 24 A.D.2d
1054, 265 N.Y.S.2d 625 (3d Dep't 1965).
32. Mercantile National Bank of Chicago v. Wismer, 48 Misc. 2d 275, 264 N.Y.S.2d
850 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
33. Reiche v. Schuster, 47 Misc. 2d 782, 263 N.Y.S.2d 287 (Nassau Co. Dist. Ct. 1965).
34. The text of section 1963 is set out infra Part II.
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of a debt, CPLR 314 is not a basis for jurisdiction permitting service
outside the State. Nor does it seem possible to consider the original
action the transacting of business in the State pursuant to CPLR 302
(a) (1). Since the original cause of action was merged in the judgment,
the activities that gave rise to the judgment should not be considered
as providing a basis for service outside the State. The reference in
paragraph 3 of CPLR 5014 to "such notice . ..as the court may
direct" refers to the motion to permit the action to be brought and
not to the method of giving notice of the commencement of an action
on a judgment when a proper basis for jurisdiction over the judgment
debtor exists. In short, if there is no basis for in personam jurisdiction
over the defendant, an action on the judgment is not possible within
this State. Of course, an action can be brought on the judgment in
some other jurisdiction that has a basis for personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.3 5
The above analysis would seem to be applicable in principle to foreign
judgments also. (Although quasi in rem jurisdiction is available, it is seldom
mentioned is conjunction with actions on judgments.) 30 However, a recent case
is in disagreement with at least one of its premises: the effect of merger.
Jay's Stores v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc.37 faced the question whether a
Massachusetts judgment enforcing a contract is to be deemed a liability or
obligation incurred by the defendant in New York for the purpose of obtain-
ing jurisdiction over the defendant in plaintiff's New York action on the judg-
ment. The answer depended upon whether the original cause, concededly arising
from an obligation incurred in New York, merged into the Massachusetts judg-
ment, so that "the judgment has not only become a full substitute for the
underlying cause . . . , but also that an action to enforce the . . .judgment is
no longer to be deemed an action on a liability or obligation incurred in New
York.'" 38 If the New York proceeding could not be considered an action on a lia-
bility incurred in New York, there was no basis for jurisdiction over the judgment
debtor, a foreign corporation. When a foreign corporation surrenders its author-
ity to do business in New York, it must designate the Secretary of State as an
agent for service of process in any action against it based upon any liability or
obligation incurred in the state.39 Three years before it surrendered its author-
ity, the defendant executed a guaranty in New York. A year after the surrender,
the Massachusetts judgment was obtained upon the guaranty. Service in the
New York action was made through the Secretary of State. The Court of Ap-
peals held that jurisdiction over the defendant had been obtained. The foreign
judgment did not destroy all of the identifying characteristics of the underlying
cause, notwithstanding the doctrine of merger. The court said that "it seems
35. 5 Weinstein, Kom & Miller, supra note 24, at ff 5014.07. On quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion suits on foreign judgments, see infra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
36. But see Yntema, supra note 3, at 1164-65.
37. 15 N.Y.2d 141, 204 N.E.2d 638, 256 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1965).
38. Id. at 146, 204 N.E.2d at 641, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 603.
39. N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1310.
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rather clear that the doctrine was not designed to weaken rights or destroy
identities which the prevailing party had in his original cause and which he
succeeded in establishing by judgment in his favor." 40 It then went on to hold
that the present action on the Massachusetts judgment be treated as an action
upon a liability or obligation incurred within this state before the surrender of
authority. The characteristics of the liability survived the adjudication.
Whether the holding will be extended to other situations remains to be
seen. To the extent that its underlying rationale lies in the limitation it an-
nounces with respect to the doctrine of merger, there would seem to be nothing
to prevent such an extension.
Commentary on the case has been scant.41 To date, its merger holding has
been relied upon in only one case, and that involved an action upon a domestic
judgment. In Statter v. Voorkes,42 defendant alleged that the action must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over him, a nondomiciliary who was served in
California. He further contended that in an action on a judgment there is no
basis for jurisdiction against a nondomiciliary under CPLR section 302 since
the claim was merged in the judgment. The issue was complicated by the fact
that, at the time of the original judgment, section 302 was not available to the
plaintiff to obtain jurisdiction over the defendant for causes arising out of the
conduct of business here. The court considered that Jay's Stores removed the
doctrine of merger as an impediment to the suit before it, and that section 302
was susceptible to retroactive effect. The burden of its decision seems to be,
therefore, that where the original cause was one which would support section
302 jurisdiction through out of state service, in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant may be similarly acquired in an action on the judgment. If the
extension of the principle of Jay's Stores which Statter seems to make is sus-
tained, the judgment creditor's position under existing practice is greatly im-
proved.
PART II
The Uniform Acts: Background
The original Act was proposed against a background of Congressional inac-
tion. The national legislature had shown no indication of exercising even a
portion of its powers under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.43
However, it seemed clear to all who were knowledgeable in the field that the
Congress could have provided for "some system of registration of judgments,
so that the valid judgments of one state might be given full faith and credit at
once in other states, without the cumbersome formality of a new suit and a new
40. 15 N.Y.2d at 147, 204 N.E.2d at 641, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
41. See McLaughlin, Civil Practice, 17 Syracuse L. Rev. 331, 344 (1965-66).
42. An unreported decision found in 157 N.Y.L.J. 17 (Feb. 14, 1967).
43. See generally Leflar, supra note 2, at 336-38.
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judgment. . .. ,,44 In the early forties, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws took up consideration of a judgment registration statute
modeled after similar legislation in other common law countries.4 5
A few years earlier, a move had been made toward a registration system
for federal district court judgments through a proposed rule of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. However, when the new Federal Rules were submitted
to Congress prior to promulgation, the rule was omitted.40 Although no official
statement has ever explained the omission,47 conjectures have been offered.
Some have assumed that the Supreme Court concluded that the legislature
was the more appropriate body for promulgation of such a rule.48 Another
explanation posits that the rule would have affected substantive rights if the
"substantial difference in result" test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York 40 were
applied and that the Supreme Court failed to adopt the rule for that reason.50
Still, a third position theorizes that there was a question of power.0 ' In any
event, Congress included the section 1963 registration provision in the 1948
revision of the judicial code:
A judgment in any action for the recovery of money or property
entered in any district court which has become final by appeal or
expiration of time for appeal may be registered in any other district
by filing therein a certified copy of such judgment. A judgment so
registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district
court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like
manner.
A certified copy of the satisfaction of any judgment in whole or
in part may be registered in like manner in any district in which the
judgment is a lien.U
Judge Clark of the Court of Appeals has remarked with respect to section
1963 that:
To my observation this statute has worked well and has facilitated the
unimpeded enforcement of federal judgments throughout the vast and
important federal judicial establishment. [A] commentator . . . re-
marks on the comparatively few cases which seem to have arisen under
the statute, but that may well be an indicia of its smooth operation.
Blessed is that country whose history is brief or legal device whose
exegesis is limited! 3
44. Id. at 337. See also Note, Constitutionality of a Uniform Reciprocal Registration
of Judgments Statute, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 488 (1961).
45. Leflar, supra note 2, at 388.
46. Id. at 342; Note, Registration of Federal Judgments, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 285, 287,
289 (1957).
47. Leflar, supra note 2, at 342.
48. Id.
49. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
50. Note, Registration of Federal Judgments, supra note 46, at 297 n.61.
51. Clark, Foreword, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 151, 153 (1957).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1964).
53. Clark, supra note 51, at 154.
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The first Uniform Act was published in the same year as the federal regis-
tration statute, but it took the form of a summary judgment act. The reasons
for the Commissioners' collective change of heart have been authoritatively
summarized. Briefly, it seems to have been conceded that no constitutional ob-
jections could be raised against a registration procedure because due process
does not require notice and opportunity for a fair hearing more than once, and
this the judgment debtor has presumably had in the first state. Defenses that
could have been raised in that proceeding are thereafter foreclosed, and those
still available-satisfaction, lack of jurisdiction, certain types of fraud-do not
require a second full scale trial so long as it remains possible for him to present
them in some manner before final enforcement. "[I] t is enough that due process
be satisfied in one state, after which the action of another state in furtherance
of the already valid judgment is essentially administrative in character, with
no new notice and hearing necessary." 54 However, the Commissioners were con-
cerned that state legislators would have constitutional doubts which would in-
hibit a registration act's acceptability, so the alternative, a summary judgment
procedure, was finally approved. 55
Sixteen years of experience with the federal registration statute seem to
have laid to rest any lingering fears as to the constitutionality or feasibility of
a registration procedure, and in 1964 the Commissioners offered the Revised
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, adopting "the practice which,
in substance, is used in Federal courts."-56 Moreover, ",. . . widespread adoption
by the states of some form of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which in-
clude regular summary judgment practice made special summary judgment acts
superfluous."
57
Whether the availability of accelerated judgment processes in New York
would make adoption of the 1948 version a mere superfluity is one of the ques-
tions to be considered here. Although the motion for summary judgment in lieu
of a complaint has been little utilized for judgments (at least in the reported
cases), regular summary judgment motions in actions on foreign judgments are
quite commonplace. 8 The original Uniform Act, however, offers several features,
among them some of the advantages of a direct registration procedure, 9 absent
from present New York motion practice. Such features could be combined with
present provisions if the later registration act should be rejected.
54. Leflar, The New Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. 336, 346-49
(1949).
55. Id. For an analysis of procedural and substantive due process in this context, see
Note, Constitutionality of a Uniform Reciprocal Registration of Judgments Statute, 36
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 488, 490-95 (1961).
56. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9A U.LA. 486, 487 (1965).
57. Id. at 486.
58. See, e.g., as to foreign country judgments, Plugmay Ltd. v. National Dynamics
Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 213, 266 N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1966), rev'd 278 N.Y.S.2d
906 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
59. Leflar, supra note 54, at 349.
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PART III
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act-1948
The Act covers any extrastate judgment entitled to full faith and credit
in the enacting state without distinction as to the remedy awarded or declara-
tion of right, duty or status of any character. The initial step toward enforce-
ment is an application for the regsistration of the judgment. The law of the
state in which registration is requested governs such matters as the time within
which the application must be made, the person entitled to bring an action on
the judgment, and which court has jurisdiction. The application must include an
authenticated copy of the judgment along with the record of any subsequent
entries affecting it, such as levies of execution or payments in partial satisfac-
tion. The clerk of the registering court must then notify the clerk of the court
of rendition that an application for registration has been made and request him
to file that information with the judgment. Registration then is a matter of
course, though enforcement awaits further procedural steps.60
After registration, the judgment creditor is entitled to have a summons
served upon the judgment debtor "as in an action brought upon the foreign
judgment in any manner authorized by the law of this state for obtaining juris-
diction of the person."6' If personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained, a notice
designating the foreign judgment and reciting the fact of registration, the court
where registered, and the time allowed for pleading shall be sent to the last
known address of the judgment debtor. If personal jurisdiction is obtained, the
judgment debtor has sixty days to set up his available defenses. If he does not
answer, or if he does not prevail on his defenses, the registered judgment be-
comes a final personal judgment of the court in which it is registered. If the
judgment debtor does prevail and the registration is set aside, this constitutes
a final judgment in favor of the judgment debtor.
If personal jurisdiction was not obtained, but a notice sent, the notice
assures fairness to the judgment debtor by making it reasonably certain that he
will learn about the course of the original judgment against him and gives him
an opporunity to set aside the registration. And, "it lays a foundation upon
which a new judgment quasi in rem can validly be entered against the property
of the judgment debtor levied upon in the registering state.' 0 2 The levy upon
the judgment debtor's property located in the state can be had as a matter of
right and without giving an undertaking-regardless of whether personal juris-
diction is secured-at any time after registration whether or not the foreign
judgment has become the final judgment in the state of registration. In this
way, a judgment creditor may obtain a type of relief almost as efficient "as
would be the case if execution could be issued directly on the foreign judg-
60. Id. at 351.
61. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act § 4 (1948).
62. Leflar, supra note 54, at 352.
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ment." 63 Thus the registered judgment can become a final judgment quasi in
rem of the court in which it is registered, binding upon the judgment debtor's
interest in property levied upon. Sale under the levy may be had at any time
after final judgment has been rendered, whether personal or quasi in rem.
The Act includes provisions for staying the registration proceeding and
setting aside the levy pending appeal from the original judgment. Partial or
complete satisfaction of the original judgment or a judgment entered on it in
any other state operates to the same extent as satisfaction of the judgment in
the rendering state. Provision is made for interest and costs, as well as appeal.
Finally, the Act is not exclusive so as to bar other procedures for action on
foreign judgments and the judgment creditor has, in effect, a choice.
Several states have had experience with this Act which will be drawn upon
in the following discussion. In addition, its various provisions will be compared
to the present summary judgment motion practice in this state.
§ 1. Definitions.-As used in this Act
(a) "Foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree or order of a court
of the United States or any State or Territory which is entitled to full faith and
credit in this state.
(b) "Register" means to [file and] [docket and] [record] a foreign judg-
ment in a court of this state.
(c) "Levy" means to take control of or create a lien upon property under
any judicial writ or process whereby satisfaction of a judgment may be enforced
against such property.
(d) "Judgment debtor" means the party against whom a foreign judgment
has been rendered.
Comment. Subsection (a) evokes two comments. The first thing to be no-
ticed is that it does not restrict the scope of the Act to money judgments, or
judgments granting only certain kinds of relief. "The fact that there is a 'judicial
proceeding' entitled to full faith and credit within the meaning of Article IV,
Section 1, of the United States Constitution is the only criterion employed." 64
Since the United States Supreme Court authoritatively delimits the constitu-
tional standard, there is no other agency "which could as authoritatively fix the
limits and scope ... ."65 Thus, it makes no difference whether the foreign judg-
ment requires the payment of money, or orders or restrains the doing of an act,
or declares rights or duties of any other character in law or equity, in probate,
guardianship, receivership, or any other type of proceeding. 66 This is in marked
contrast to the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, as well as
parallel enforcement legislation in England and Canada. 67 Those countries do
not, however, have an equivalent to the full faith and credit clause.
63. Commissioners' Note to § 6, 9A U.LA. 480.
64. Commissioners' Note to § 1, 9A U.LA. 476.
65. Leflar, supra note 54 at 350.
66. On foreign equity decrees generally, see Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign
Equity Decrees, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 183 (1957). See also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 102 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
67. The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933, 23 -and 24 Geo.
5, c. 13, excludes matrimonial actions and proceedings in connection with administration of
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Present New York practice is not so unequivocal. While it is clear, under
Rule 3212 of the CPLR, that any party in "any action," may move for sum-
mary judgment after issue has been joined, section 3212 arguably restricts a
motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint to judgments for the pay-
ment of money only. As already noted, no court has decided this question.08
The second thing to be noted about subsection (a) is that it is confined to
state or federal judgments from within the United States or any territory of this
country. If the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act is adopted,
and the Uniform Enforcement Act is also adopted, section 1(a) should be
amended to remove any possible ambiguity as to the availability of its provisions
to qualifying extranational money judgments. The arguments in favor of an
accelerated enforcement procedure for foreign country judgments have been set
forth in the accompanying article on the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act.
Subsection (b) involves only a choice of terms. If this Uniform Act is
adopted, its provisions should accord, where possible, with the terminology
presently found in the CPLR,69 so that the appropriate choice would be "to
file and docket" rather than "record."
Subdivision (c) simply defines a levy through a reference to whatever
process is available in a state to create a lien upon property from which satis-
faction of a judgment may be obtained.
The definition of "judgment debtor" in subdivision (d) is in substantial
accord with that in § 105 (k) of the CPLR. The latter differs only in its exclu-
sion from the definition defendants not summoned in the action.
Conclusion. If the Uniform Act is adopted, no change of substance should
be made in section 1. Subsection (a), since it is not confined to money judg-
ments, probably goes farther than the most efficient enforcement measure now
available for foreign judgment enforcement. Under this section, the criteria for
applicability of the Act's provisions would be those designated by the Supreme
Court. As yet, the Court has not had occasion to determine whether full faith
and credit requires a state to enforce a valid sister state judgment that orders
the doing of an act other than the payment of money or that enjoins the doing
of an act.70
The Commissioners elsewhere have contemplated that foreign country judg-
decedents' estates, bankruptcy, winding up of companies, lunacy and guardianship of in-
fants. The Canadian Act also applies only to judgments for money. Uniform Foreign Judg-
ments Act of Canada § 1(1)(a) (1933).
68. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
Query whether a rule 3212 motion for summary judgment may be made in an action on
a foreign matrimonial judgment. Rule 3212(d) provides that in a "matrimonial action," the
motion can only he made on certain kinds of evidence which furnish a defense. CPLR
§ -105(m) defines a "matrimonial action" as including an action "for a declaration of the
validity of nullity of foreign judgment of divorce."
69. See N.Y. CPLR §§ 5016 and 5018.
70. Restatement (Second) of Conffict of Laws § 102, comment c (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967).
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ments meeting the requirements of the Uniform Foreign Money-judgment Rec-
ognition Act should be enforceable through this Act.71 To avoid the possibility
of any misunderstanding, it might be advisable to add to subsection (a) a sen-
tence to indicate that an enacting state accepts the recommendation of the
Commissioners. The subsection would then read:
(a) "Foreign judgment" means (1) any judgment, decree or order of
a court of the United States or of any State or Territory which is en-
titled to full faith and credit in this state; or (2) any judgment of a
foreign state which is entitled to recognition under the Uniform For-
eign Money-Judgments Recognition Act.7 2
§ 2. Registration of Judgment.-On application made within the time
allowed for bringing an action on a foreign judgment in this state, any person
entitled to bring such action may have a foreign judgment registered in any
court of this state having jurisdiction of such an action.
Comment. This section governs the intital step toward enforcement. Present
New York law on limitations and persons entitled to bring an action on a foreign
judgment would be applicable. The law of this state also designates the appro-
priate court. Since such matters vary widely among the states, it would have
been difficult, and probably unwise, for the drafters of the act to formulate
special rules for the purposes of the Act.73 In New York, actions on money judg-
ments, whether local or foreign, must be brought within 20 years if the judgment
or any part of it directs the payment of a sum of money.7 4 A residual statute of
limitations of six years, section 213(1), governs actions in equity.
The effect of the limitations statute in the judgment-rendering state is
determined by full faith and credit standards.7 5 But full faith and credit does
not require a state to enforce a sister state judgment if the enforcement action
is commenced following the expiration of the second state's statutory period for
the enforcement of judgments. 6
If the question should arise of the judgment's "liveness" in the state of
rendition, what is the effect of registration under section 2 of the Act? In 1953,
a plaintiff petitioned to register a 1944 Missouri alimony decree under Illinois'
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The judgment debtor argued
that Missouri, by statute, conclusively presumes payment of judgments after ten
71. See Commissioners' Note to § 3 of the Uniform Foreign Money-judgments Recog-
nition Act, 9B U.LA. 66 (1966).
72. Such an admendment is meaningless if the Uniform Foreign Money-judgment
Recognition Act is not in force. If it is in force, the amendment is not necessary, strictly
speaking, because section 3 of the recognition act provides that a foreign judgment is en-
forceable in the same manner as sister state judgments. If it is desired to achieve more
favorable treatment for American judgments abroad, however, the amendment would alert
the code-minded civil law countries that equality of treatment in enforcement is an actuality.
73. Leflar, supra note 54, at 351.
74. N.Y. CPLR § 211(b) and Practice Commentary.
75. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 118 and comment c (Proposed
Official Draft, 1967).
76. Id.
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years. Although the Illinois action was begun within the ten year period, it was
not concluded until after its expiration. It was held that the vitality of the
foreign judgment is to be determined as of the date that it is registered; the
operative fact is the filing of the petition to register it. 77
Since any judgment entitled to full fatih and credit, whether in law or in
equity, for money or not, is registrable under the Act (although only certain
money judgments from foreign countries would be registrable), an adopting
state would not have to face some of the difficulties presented by the federal
registration statute. Because section 1963 applies only to judgments for the
recovery of money or property, a judgment which issues only an injunction
would not be registrable under that section. But if a judgment both awards
money and issues an injunction, the entire judgment may be registered, although
the injunctive portion is not enforceable. 78
Although it is clear that injunctions for other than the payment of money
must be recognized in other states under the full faith and credit clause,79 no
definite pronouncement as to enforcement has yet been made by the Supreme
Court.8 0
Conclusion. If the Act is adopted, there is no reason to change section 2.
§ 3. Application for Registration.-A [verified] [petition] for registration
shall set forth a copy of the judgment to be registered, the date of its entry
and the record of any subsequent entries affecting it [such as levies of execu-
tion, payments in partial satisfaction and the like] all authenticated in the man-
ner authorized by the laws of the United States or of this state, and a prayer
that the judgment be registered. The Clerk of the registering court shall notify
the clerk of the court which rendered the original judgment that application for
registration has been made, and shall request him to file this information with
the judgment.
Comment. Rules 4540 and 4542 of the CPLR prescribe the method of
authenticating official records of courts in the United States and attestation and
authentication of foreign records respectively. The federal statute on authenti-
cation is 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964). If the federal enactment is complied with,
no more is needed, but the procedure set out by it is not exclusive, and a sister
state judgment may be authenticated by state statutory or common law meth-
ods.81
The desirability of a verified petition is questionable. Section 3020 of the
CPLR defines verification and specifies the circumstances in which it is to be
77. Light v. Light, 12 lI. 2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1958). Similar questions have arisen
under the federal registration statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1964). See, e.g., Mantanuska Valley
Lines Inc. v. Moliter, 365 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1966), which also reviews earlier decisions on
limitations problems.
78. Stiller v. Hardman, 324 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1963).
79. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 102 and comment a (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967).
80. Id., comment c.
81. Leflar, supra note 54, at 351.
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made.82 If a complaint is verified, "each subsequent pleading shall also be veri-
fied" according to section 3020(a). An answer must also be verified when the
complaint charges the defendant with having confessed or suffered a judgment.8 3
Strictly speaking, a complaint is not involved in a registration proceeding under
the uniform Act. Arguably, then, verification would not be necessary unless this
section of the uniform Act required it. Given the tenor of the Practice Commen-
tary to section 3020, it would hardly seem advisable gratuitously to broaden
still further the "grotesque smile" of the verification requirement.8 4
Most states having enacted the uniform Act kept the word "petition." In
this state, the term "petition" is used to describe the initiating pleading in special
proceedings,8 5 and retention of the term here would emphasize the difference
between the old and the new procedures. However, the uniform procedure pro-
vided for special proceedings by Article 4 of the CPLR would not be applicable
to the summary judgment procedure set up by this Act. Article 4 provides "a
common terminology and procedure and to supply procedural detail often
sketchily covered by the statute authorizing a specific special proceeding."8' 6
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act sets forth a comprehen-
sive procedural scheme, which would prevail over Article 4 as well as any
contrary general practice provisions. 87
The petition for registration setting forth the authenticated copy of the
judgment to be registered is also to contain the record of any subsequent entries
affecting it. This is substantially consistent with rule 3016(d) of the CPLR
which requires that "In an action on a judgment, the complaint shall state the
extent to which any judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the defendant,
or against a person jointly liable with the defendant, on the same cause of action
has been satisfied." The drafters of the Act give examples of such entries in the
brackets. Some adopting states have omitted this material; others have retained
it. Its inclusion is probably not necessary, and terminology among states and
countries may differ.
The clerk of the registering court must notify the clerk of the rendering
court that application for registration has been made, and request him to file
82. See also N.Y. CPLR § 1502 requiring that complaints in certain actions against co-
obligors not summoned in the original action be verified.
83. N.Y. CPLR § 3020(b) (1). § 3020(c) requires verification of a defense that does not
involve the merits of the action. Defenses to actions on foreign judgments may not go to
the merits of the original cause. See, e.g., Gibson v. Epps, 352 S.W.2d 45 (Springfield Ct.
App., Mo., 1961). See generally the accompanying report on the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act on foreign country judgments and Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, Topic 4, Defenses to Recognition and Enforcement (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967). Thus, subsection (c) would seem to require a verified answer in virtually
all actions on foreign judgments.
84. Siegel, Practice Commentary to CPLR § 3020.
85. See N.Y. CPLR §§ 103, 105, 402. For a discussion of special proceedings in New
York, See Abraham, A Unitary Approach to Special Proceedings: The New York Proposals,
9 Buffalo L. Rev. 471 (1960).
86. Thornton, Practice Commentary to CPLR Art. 4.
87. See 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice f[ 401.04 (1966).
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that information with the judgment. "[R]easonable protection to any person
who might for any reason rely on the record of the original judgment without
having received other notice of the pendency of the registration proceeding" is
thus provided.88 Illinois requires that the petitioner prepare and present to the
clerk the notice to be sent, and the sending is to be by registered mail. Having
the registering party prepare the notice would ease still further the burden on
the courts, and accelerate the registration process to the advantage of both the
petitioner and the court. The petitioner would benefit because at any time after
registration, a levy may be made under the judgment upon any property of the
judgment debtor which is subject to execution for the satisfaction of judgments.8"
Illinois also adds a sentence to this section which states: "The filing of the
petition constitutes registration of the foreign judgment."8 0 Although it differs
somewhat from the definition of "register' 'in section 1(b) of the Act, the sen-
tence does provide a time certain for purposes of levy and determining the run-
ning of the statute of limitations. Some similar statement indicating that a
judgment is deemed to be registered immediately upon filing by the clerk of the
petition is recommended.
Conclusion. If the Act is adopted, it is recommended that section 3 add a
sentence identifying the time of registration, such as "A judgment shall be
deemed to be registered upon the filing by the clerk of a petition complying
with this section." It is also believed the purposes of the Act would be enhanced
by a requirement that the petitioner prepare and present to the clerk the notice
to be sent to the clerk of the first court.
§ 4. Personal Jurisdiction.-At any time after registration the [petitioner]
shall be entitled to have [summons] [issued and] served upon the judgment
debtor as in an action brought upon the foreign judgment, in any manner autho-
rized by the law of this state for obtaining jurisdiction of the person.
Comment. The present state of New York case law on in personam juris-
diction in actions on both foreign and domestic judgments has already been
briefly outlined.91 This section, which "is designed to lay a foundation upon
which a new personal judgment may subsequently be rendered, on the old judg-
ment as a cause of action, against the judgment debtor,"0 2 would not affect its
development. The same problems of jurisdiction would arise under the motion
practice, or if the procedure created by the Act is characterized as a special
proceeding.93
Since application for registration is called a petition under section 3, the
one making such application is appropriately called the petitioner. The term is
88. Leflar, supra note 54 at 352; Commissioners' Note to § 3 of the Uniform Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments Act (1948 version).
89. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act § 6, (1948 version).
90. 11. S. H. A. ch. 77, § 90.
91. See text accompanying supra notes 32-40.
92. Commissioners' Note to § 4 of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act.
93. See N.Y. CPLR § 304.
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suggested in the first set of brackets in section 4 and should be retained. The
means of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor is, the section
suggests, by issuance and service of a summons. Use of "summons" would indi-
cate that the Act is in the nature of an action, rather than a special proceeding,
since section 304 of the CPLR states that a special proceeding is begun by ser-
vice of a notice of petition or order to show cause, while an action is commenced
by service of a summons. The end result of both is a judgment.94 The only rea-
son fof distinguishing the two is to provide a summary procedure in certain
cases.95 This is what the Act does. Use of terminology of special proceedings
highlights the similarity of purpose, while leaving unimpaired the tailored pro-
cedure of the Act. The only discrepancy would be in the much shorter time pe-
riod allowed for answer under a section 403 (b) special proceeding, but this would
not prevail over the more generous allotment of the Act.96 Few of the adopting
states have been quite so liberal in the time for answer as the Commissioners,
but all grant a considerably longer time than the eight days of section 403 (b)
and the motion practice upon which it is based.
Where summonses are dealt with in the CPLR-and, indeed, where service
of notice of petition is regulated in section 403-they are simply "served.". The
word "issue" or "issuance" does not appear in this context and could be omitted
from section 4 of the Act.
Finally, the merits of following the Illinois modification of this section
should be discussed. Illinois provides as follows:
At any time after registration the petitioner shall be entitled to
have summons issued and served upon the judgment debtor, as in
other civil cases.97
The section has not been judicially interpreted in that state, and it is not clear
whether by the change in terminology a different substantive content is effectu-
ated. The major difference is, of course, the omission of any reference to "an
action brought upon the foreign judgment." This may reflect a decision on the
part of the Illinois drafters that general rules for obtaining in personarn juris-
diction are applicable alike to actions on judgments and "other civil cases."
Putting aside the particular difficulties caused by the doctrine of merger, this
is, of course, true. However, since exploration of the doctrine as it affects actions
on judgments has only begun in this state,98 retention of the original wording
of the section would serve to alert practitioners that there may be significant
differences.
Conclusion. This section is very important to the overall scheme of the
Act which contemplates that the foreign judgment will become a judgment of
94. N.Y. CPLR Rule 411.
95. 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice ff 411.01 (1966).
96. See infra §§ 7, 8, 12 of the Uniform Act.
97. Ill. S.H.A. ch. 77, § 91.
98. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
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the second state, either personal or quasi in rem. 9 It is believed that there is
little reason for departing significantly from the text provided by the drafters.
§ 5. Notice in Absence of Personal Jurisdiction.-If jurisdiction of the per-
son of the judgment debtor cannot be obtained, a [notice] [summons] clearly
designating the foreign judgment and reciting the fact of registration, the court
in which it is registered, and the time allowed for pleading, shall be sent by the
Clerk of the registering court by registered mail to the last known address of
the judgment debtor. Proof of such mailing shall be made by certificate of the
Clerk.
Comment. If personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor cannot be
obtained, this provision assures fairness to him by "making it reasonably cer-
tain that he will actually learn about what is being done with the judgment
that has been rendered against him. 100 It also lays the foundation for a new
quasi in rem judgment in the second state against the property of the judgment
debtor levied upon under section 6.101
Under what circumstances resort to this section would be necessary is still
an open question. As already pointed out, personal jurisdiction in actions on
judgments has only begun to be explored. The court of appeals' decision in
Jay's Stores'0 2 involved the designation of an agent in the state for service of
process upon relinquishment of a foreign corporation's authority to do business
within the state. There are as yet no reported decisions involving the application
of section 302 to actions on foreign judgments.
The closest equivalent to this section of the Act is section 314 of the CPLR
under which service without the state may be made in certain actions to obtain
quasi in rem jurisdiction. Section 314(3) provides that
Service may be made without the state by any person authorized
by section 313 in the same manner as service is made within the state
... where a levy upon property of the person to be served has been
made within the state pursuant to an order of attachment or a chattel
of such person has been seized in an action to recover a chattel.
Section 5 of the Act differs from the CPLR provision also in the manner in
which service is to be effectuated. 10 3 The Act, of course, provides for notice by
registered mail, concerning which the CPLR does not have much to say. Per-
sonal delivery to the person to be served is the normal method for service out-
side the state under section 313. Substituted service under CPLR 308(3) is
permissible without a court order. In addition, other methods may be specified
by court order under CPLR 308(4), among them being service by registered or
99. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, §§ 7, 12.
100. Commissioners' Note to § 5 of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act.
101. Id.
102. Jay's Stores v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 141, 204 N.E.2d 638, 256
N.Y.S.2d 600 (1965). This case is discussed in text accompanying supra notes 37-41.
103. The Illinois version of this section provides that if in personam jurisdiction cannot
be obtained, "service may be had by publication or by personal service of summons and a
copy of the petition outside this State, as in other civil cases." Ill. S.HA. ch. 77, § 91.
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certified mail. 04 However, New York statutes do provide specifically for service
by mailing in certain situations:
There remain a number of special statutes covering particular con-
tacts such as the nonresident motorist provision of section 253 of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law or the departing resident motorist provision
section 254 of the same law. These statutes are not superseded. Nor
do the "specific provisions" of other laws "supersede the general pro-
visions of section 302 of the CPLR. If the specific provisions are used
then their service provisions will have to be utilized. For example, sec-
tion 253 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law provides for service by mail.
This may prove more convenient than personal service under CPLR
313.105
Thus there is precedent for providing specially for service by mail. Certainly
notice by registered mail is calculated to make reasonably certain that the judg-
ment debtor will learn of the proceedings against him, more so than publica-
tion.10 0 It is less expensive than personal or substituted service, and probably
quicker. It furthers the aim of the Act, which is to provide an efficient and in-
expensive enforcement method, while assuring at least a minimum fairness to
the judgment debtor who is almost certainly aware of the outstanding judgment
against him.
Conclusion. On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is believed that the
purposes sought by the Act would be better obtained by retention of section 5
as originally drafted. The only observation to be made here is that the bracketed
word "notice" should be chosen over the bracketed word "summons" to con-
form to section 4.
§ 6. Levy.-At any time after registration and regardless of whether juris-
diction of the person of the judgment debtor has been secured or final judg-
ment has been obtained, a levy may be made under the registered judgment
upon any property of the judgment debtor which is subject to execution or
other judicial process for satisfaction of judgments.
Comment. This is the most important innovation made by the Act. 07 The
104. 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice ff 313.06 (1966). Service of
notice in a special proceeding is to be served in the same manner as a summons. N.Y. CPLR
§ 403(c). Certified mail was utilized in Matter of Ruvulo v. Long Island R.R., 45 Misc. 2d
136, 256 N.Y.S.2d 279 (Sup. Ct. 1965) in a petition by a judgment creditor to require pay-
ment by a person indebted to the judgment debtor. The judgment debtor could be served
by certified mail, but this debtor should be personally served.
105. Id. at f1 302.13.
106. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 57 Comment c (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967). Compare, however, I Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice
J 314.02 (1966):
In its earlier proposals [respecting section 314] the Advisory Committee provided
for service outside the state by registered or certified mail. Subsequent Amendments
to what is now paragraph 3 of CPLR 308, provided for substituted service and
permitted mailing plus affixing or delivering to a person of suitable age and discre-
tion. The Advisory Committee considered this "method of service" superior to mail-
ing alone as a method of giving notice to the defendant. The court may, however,
by order under paragraph 4 of N.Y. CPLR § 308, permit service merely by mailing.
107. Paulsen, Enforcing the Money Judgment of a Sister State, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 202,
219 (1957).
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judgment creditor is placed in a much better position than was previously, or
is now, afforded him. Although CPLR 6201 lists several grounds for attach-
ment in "any action, except a matrimonial action, where the plaintiff has
demanded and would be entitled, in whole or in part, or the alternative, to a
money judgment against one or more defendants," whether an order of attach-
ment will issue in a particular case is in the discretion of the trial court. Even
if the plaintiff's cause of action falls clearly within one of the classes of actions
in which attachment is available, he is not entitled to an order as a matter of
right' 08 Also, the grounds for attachment are limited and may not be present
in an action on a foreign judgment. 10 9 In addition, the plaintiff must submit an
affidavit with the motion for an order of attachment and give an undertaking
of not less than $250.110 Section 6 of the Act, by contrast, provides a speedy
and simple process by which the judgment creditor may be assured that he will
recover at least to the extent of the property levied upon, whether or not he has
obtained or could obtain personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor. He
therefore has "a type of relief almost as efficient as would be the case if execu-
tion could be issued directly on the foreign judgment.""' Under the Act, quasi
in rem jurisdiction would be obtained through section 5 notice in conjuntion
with the levy."1
2
Section 6 of the Act refers to the existing law of the state for identification
of property subject to levy. Section 5201 and 6202 of the CPLR indicate the
eligible debts or property.
Conclusion. Although the accelerated procedure created by the Act is a
substantial improvement over a new action on a judgment, its advantages over
summary judgment motion practice are less evident until the creditor's right to
levy is taken into account. 18 It is at the core of the protection afforded by the
Act which, if adopted, should include section 6 without change.
§ 7. New Personal Judgment.-If the judgment debtor fails to plead within
[sixty days] after jurisdiction over his person has been obtained, or if the court
after hearing has refused to set the registration aside, the registered judgment
shall become a final personal judgment of the court in which it is registered.
Comment. This is the provision which, in the opinion of the drafters, creates
"a summary judgment procedure specially suited to actions on foreign judg-
ments.""14 However, it lacks the characteristic short notice, allowed in special
108. 7 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, supra note 104 at II 6201.03 (1966).
109. See N.Y. CPLR § 6201.
110. See N.Y. CPLR § 6212.
111. Leflar, The New Uniform Judgments Act, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. 336, 353 (1949); Com-
missioners' Note to § 6 of the Uniform Foreign Judgments Enforcement Act.
112. Although the Act does not specify that a levy be made before notice is sent to
the judgment debtor in the absence of personal jurisdiction, the "safe approach is to assume
that the defendant's property must be seized before service is made upon the defendant out-
side the state." 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, supra note 103 at ff 314.18.
113. 7 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil Practice I9 6201.01 (1966).
114. Commissioners' Note to § 7 of the Uniform Foreign Judgments Enforcement Act.
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proceedings and motion practice.11 5 The sixty days suggested in section 7
is considerably longer than the time for service of notice of petition and
answer under the uniform procedure governing special proceedings 1 6 or
under the section 3213 motion for summary judgment in lieu of a complaint.
Many of the states which have adopted the Act have shortened the time in which
the defendant must plead to thirty, or in one case, twenty days. If a motion
for summary judgment is served with the summons under section 3213, the time
is to conform with rule 320(a) which requires an appearance to be made within
twenty or thirty days, depending upon the method of service. The time for ser-
vice of notice of petition and answer in a special proceedings is shorter still.1 17
There is no particular need to collate the time for pleading with that al-
lowed in other actions. The purpose of the Act is to set up a procedure specially
suited for judgment enforcement, and the time for pleading should reflect this.
It may be that the suggested sixty days is too long, insofar as it does not attain
a swift, as well as an efficient, enforcement. Even though the judgment creditor
is protected by his section 6 right to levy, thirty days seems ample safeguard
for a debtor over whom personal jurisdiction has been obtained.
Illinois has changed this section to limit a binding in personam judgment
to cases where service was made upon the debtor within the state." 8 Such a
limitation, of course, places a statutory limitation on judicial development of
the holding in Jay's Stores," 9 at least where enforcement proceedings are
brought under this Act.120
Conclusion. Section 7, as drafted, should be retained, the sole recommenda-
tion being a shortening of the pleading time to thirty days. It is recognized that
the judgment creditor is protected by his levy, but the debtor has been person-
ally subjected to the jurisdiction of the court. There is no compelling reason
why he should be treated more favorably here than he is in other civil actions.
§ 8. Defenses.-Any defense [set off] [counterclaim] [or cross complaint]
which under the law of this state may be asserted by the defendant in an action
on the foreign judgment may be presented by appropriate pleadings and the
115. 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, supra note 104 at ff 403.02.
116. N.Y. CPLR § 403(b).
117. N.Y. CPLR § 403(b). See also N.Y. CPLR § 3012.
118. The Illinois version differs from the original considerably. Ill. S.H.A. ch 77, § 94
provides:
If after personal service of process upon him within this state the judgment debtor
fails to plead within the time specified in the summons served upon him, or in any
event within thirty days after jurisdiction of the person of the judgment debtor has
been obtained, or if the court after hearing has refused to set the registration aside,
the registered judgment shall become a final judgment of the court in which it is
registered, binding personally upon the defendant. [Emphasis added].
Although no case has been found interpreting the section in Illinois, it seems to forestall
any developments in the direction of obtaining personal jurisdiction over judgment debtors
by application of long-arm principles. It may be relevant that the Act was adopted in 1951,
prior to Illinois' "long arm" statute, Ill. Civ. Pr. Act § 17, in 1955.
119. Jay's Stores v. Ann Lewis Shops, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 141, 204 N.E.2d 638, 256 N.Y.S.
2d 600 (1965), discussed in text accompanying supra note 37.
120. Section 16 of the Act preserves alternative methods of enforcement.
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issues raised thereby shall be tried and determined as in other civil actions.
Such pleadings must be filed within [sixty days] after personal jurisdiction is
acquired over him or within [sixty days] after the mailing of the notice pre-
scribed in section 5.
Comment. The defenses available to sister state and federal court judg-
ments are limited by the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution.
Under that clause, "there are certain defenses, particularly lack of jurisdiction
in the court rendering the judgment, payment of judgment and fraud or collu-
sion in its procurement, which the judgment debtor may properly raise in a later
suit on the judgment.' 12 1 Any defense going to the merits of the original cause
will not, however, be entertained. 122 "The uniform act is so drafted as to secure
a judgment debtor the essentials of due process of law in minimum form, at the
same time giving him reasonable opportunity to present every defense which
under the law he is entitled to present."12 3
Full faith and credit standards apply. If a defense to a sister state or fed-
eral court judgment is foreclosed by constitutional standards, it cannot prevail
in an action on the judgment or under the procedure created by the Act.124 But
enforcement, like recognition, turns on whether the foreign judgment is valid in
the state of rendition. In Roseberry v. Crump,'125 the judgment creditor brought
suit, under the Missouri version of the uniform Act, upon an alimony provision
of a Kansas divorce judgment. The judgment debtor asserted the invalidity of
the judgment in the first state, attacking both the personal and subject matter
jurisdiction of the Kansas court and alleging fraud. The court, declaring that
the alimony provision was void, invalidated a general execution and garnish-
ment that had been issued.
Shroeder v. Homestead Corp. 26 was a proceeding under the Nebraska's
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. The petition pleaded the exis-
tence of a judgment rendered in Iowa and prayed that it be registered in
Nebraska. The judgment debtors defended on the ground that the Iowa court
lacked jurisdiction over the land in question which, they asserted, was actually
located in Nebraska. The lower court's finding that the Iowa judgment was
void, and its denial of registration and application for writ of scire facias were
affirmed.
In Light v. Light,127 the case which held that the vitality of the foreign
121. Commissioners' Note to § 8 of the Uniform Foreign Judgments Enforcement Act.
See generally Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, ch. 5 (Proposed Official Draft,
1967).
122. See, e.g., Gibson v. Epps, 352 S.W.2d 45 (Springfield Ct. App., Mo. 1961).
123. Commissioners' Note to § 8 of the Uniform Foreign Judgments Enforcement Act.
124. See Gibson v. Epps, 352 S.W.2d 45 (Springfield Ct. App., Mo., 1961).
125. 345 S.W.2d 117 (Sup. Ct., Mo. 1961) (holding that the Supreme Court did not
have jurisdiction of the appeal since no construction of the full faith and credit clause was
involved but merely its application).
126. 171 Neb. 792, 107 N.W.2d 750 (1961), cert. den. sub. nom. Schroeder v. Williams,
368 U.S. 32 (1961).
127. 12 Il. 2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1958).
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judgment is to be determined as of the date it is registered, not at the time the
action is concluded, the court said:
Because the statute is new, we think that it is appropriate to say
a word as to the kind of judgment or decree that it contemplates.
What is registered is the foreign judgment or decree, to the extent that
no defense to it exists. If there is a defense that bars its enforcement
completely, the final judgment must be for the defendant. Where a
partial defense exists, as by partial satisfaction or limitations, that
defense must be recognized in the final judgment. This can con-
veniently be done by first setting out the foreign judgment or decree
in full in the final order entered in the Illinois court, and then indi-
cating clearly the portions of it that are entered as a judgment of the
Illinois court.128
Defenses to foreign country judgments are codified in the Uniform Foreign-
Money Judgments Recognition Act.' 29
Section 8 offers choices of terminology. New York uses the term "cross-
claim" rather than "cross-complaint"' 8 0 and regards setoffs as included in the
term "counterclaim."' 1
The remaining optional materials are the two references to "sixty days" in
brackets in the last sentence of the section. The first ought to conform to
section 7, where it was recommended that the time for pleading be shortened to
thirty days. A longer period may be thought desirable where quasi in rem juris-
diction is involved.
Conclusion. Section 8 seeks to afford to a judgment debtor due process in
minimum form, while giving him reasonable opportunity to present any defenses
he may have. As worded, it may be applied both to judgments entitled to full
faith and credit and to foreign country judgments. The suggested changes have
the sole purpose of conforming the section to current New York terminology.
The time period should be consistent with whatever limits on pleading are
adopted for section 7.132
§ 9. Pendency of Appeal.-If the judgment debtor shows that an appeal
from the original judgment is pending or that he is entitled and intends to
appeal therefrom, the court shall, on such terms as it thinks just, postpone the
trial for such time as appears sufficient for the appeal to be concluded, and
128. Id. at 514-15, 147 N.E.2d at 41-42.
129. See generally Kulzer, Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in New York:
The Uniform Foreign Money-judgments Recognition Act, 18 Buffalo L. Rev. 1 (1968).
130. See, e.g., N.Y. CPLR §§ 3011, 3019.
131. See Otto v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 268 A. D. 400, 51 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1945), aff'd 294
N.Y. 798, 62 N.E.2d 236 (1945).
132. Compare Ill. S.H.A. ch. 77, § 95:
Any defense, set-off or counterclaim which under the law of this state may be
asserted by the defendant in an action on the foreign judgment may be presented
by appropriate pleadings and the issues raised thereby shall be tried and determined
as in other civil cases. Defendant shall file his pleadings within the time specified in
the summons or publication notice, as in other civil cases.
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may set aside the levy upon proof that the defendant has furnished adequate
security for satisfaction of the judgment.
Comment. Postponement will not be an issue unless the defendant appears
and raises the question of appeal. However, what disposition should be made
when the defendant does not appear but the registration petition provided for
by section 3 of the Act includes a notice of appeal in the record of any subse-
quent entries affecting the foreign judgment? New York, for example, provides
by section 5515 of the CPLR that "An appeal shall be taken by serving on the
adverse party a notice of appeal and filing it in the office where the judgment or
order of the court of original instance is entered . . . ." Presumably, it is neces-
sary for the judgment debtor to make an appearance for a stay to result from the
pendency of an appeal in the first state, whether or not the registration petition
indicates that one has been taken. The showing by the judgment debtor is, by
the wording of section 9, a condition to a postponement.
The Act applies to judgments in both law and equity. Although a law
judgment is not, at common law, vacated by a pending appeal, an appeal in
equity does vacate a decree, although the rule has frequently been changed by
statute. Even if appellate proceedings in the first state do not vacate the judg-
ment, the second state will usually stay its own disposition of the judgment, or
execution thereof, pending determination of the appeal. "As between states of
the United States, full faith and credit does not prevent in such circumstances
either stay of the judgment or stay of execution pending determination of the
appeal." 83
The section gives the court considerable discretion in disposing of the pro-
ceedings pending the appeal in the first state. Illinois grants still further dis-
cretion by substituting "may" for "shall" following the word "court."' 18 4 In the
absence of any constitutional mandate, there is of course nothing to hinder such
an alteration, if it is deemed desirable. However, it does not seem necessary. If
an appeal has not already been taken, the judgment debtor must convince the
court that he intends to take an appeal, and that he is entitled to do so. This
would prevent the procedure created by the Act from being hamstrung by a
delaying debtor.
The second change made by Illinois substitutes "any" for "the" immediately
preceding the word "levy." Since a levy need not have been made under section
6, "any" seems the more appropriate designation.
Conclusion. If the Act is adopted, there seems to be no reason for changing
section 9, except for the relatively minor substitution of "any" for "the" im-
mediately preceding the word "levy."
§ 10. Effect of Setting Aside Registration.-An order setting aside a regis-
tration constitutes a final [judgment] in favor of the judgment debtor.
Comment. No adopting state has made any change in this section. The
133. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 113, Comment b (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967); see also id., § 107, Comment e.
134. Ill. SMA. ch. 77, § 96.
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drafters make the word "judgment" an option by enclosing it in brackets, but
there seems to be no reason to substitute another for it. Under rule 411 of the
CPLR, special proceedings now terminate in a judgment rather than a final
order, and the Practice Commentary points out that this was intended to avoid
"unfortunate distinctions" made between the two, some of the more relevant
pertaining to appeals and enforcement.
Conclusion. Section 10, in the event of enactment, should be retained as
originally drafted.
§ 11. Appeal.-An appeal may be taken by either party from any [judg-
ment] [order] [or decision] sustaining or setting aside a registration on the
same terms as an appeal for a [judgment] [order] [or decision] of the same
court.
Comment. Since this section provides only for appeal from the sustaining
or setting aside of a registration, and does not mention any dispositions prior
thereto, "judgment" would seem an appropriate term. In any case, only "judg-
ment or order" should be retained, since the word "decision" is not found
in a similar sense in article 55 of the CPLR which deals with appeals.
Some sections of article 55 speak of both judgments and orders. Section 5512,
for example, provides that "An initial appeal shall be taken from the judgment or
order of the court of original instance and an appeal seeking review of an ap-
pellate determination shall be taken from the order entered in the office of the
clerk of the court whose order is sought to be reviewed."
Conclusion. If the Act is adopted, this section preserves the right of either
party to appeal from an unfavorable judgment as in a common law action on
the foreign judgment.
§ 12. New Judgment Quasi in Rem.-If personal jurisdiction of the judg-
ment debtor is not secured within [sixty days] after the levy and he as [sic]
not, within [sixty days] after the mailing of the notice prescribed by section 5,
acted to set aside the registration [or to assert a set-off] [counter-claim] [or
cross-complaint] the registered judgment shall be a final judgment quasi in rem
of the court in which it is registered, binding upon the judgment debtor's
interest in property levied upon, and the court shall enter an order to that effect.
Comment. The device of obtaining satisfaction of a foreign judgment by
acquiring quasi in rem jurisdiction in an action on a judgment was suggested
long before promulgation of the Act, but does not seem to have found much
application in the reported cases. In 1935, Professor Yntema wrote:
... the conception that the enforcement of a foreign judgment must
take the form of an ordinary action in personam upon the debt evi-
denced by the transcript of the judgment appears to confirm three prime
defects in the procedure. The first is unnecessary delay. The second is
unnecessary expense. And the third is the additional difficulty created
by the necessity of securing jurisdiction over the person of the judg-
ment debtor. The two defects first mentioned are partially, but by no
means completely, mitigated in those jurisdictions where a summary
judgment procedure is available. The third defect is rendered toler-
able in the United States only by the existence of numerous attach-
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ment and garnishment statutes, which, under the doctrine of Pennoyer
v. Neff and its sequelae, in effect, do away with the necessity of service
upon the person of a judgment debtor, if property can be found.188
Section 12 of the Act explicitly takes advange of quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion in order to assure that a judgment creditor may recover at least to the
extent of the debtor's property upon which jurisdiction under section 5 was
based.136
Illinois has made several changes in this section, consistent with its treat-
ment of several other sections of the Act. Perhaps most importantly, its version
seems to require that whenever service is made upon the judgment debtor
outside of the state, and the judgment debtor fails to plead, the registered
judgment becomes a quasi in rem judgment binding upon the judgment debtor's
interest in property levied upon.1 37 To do likewise may limit the development
of New York case law on jurisdiction in actions on foreign judgments.
Although a longer pleading time than is provided in section 7 might be
appropriate for a quasi in rem proceeding, thirty days is probably a reasonable
time. The judgment debtor's property will have been levied upon and notice
will have been sent.
The material following the word "registration" should be altered to read
"or to assert a counterclaim or cross-claim," consistently with section 8.
Conclusion. Unless it is desired to set jurisdictional standards in this Act
for the enforcement of foreign judgments in a manner other than that being
evolved by the courts, it is not necessary to change this section.
§ 13. Sale under Levy-Sale under the levy may be had at any time after
final judgment, either personal or quasi in rem, but not earlier except as other-
wise provided by law for sale under levy on perishable goods. Sale and distribu-
tion of the proceeds shall be made in accordance with the law of this state.
Comment. In most cases, a judgment is merely a means to an end.138 The
laws of New York will govern the methods by which the judgment creditor
obtains the relief to which he is entitled by sale under the levy that was made
according to section 6 of the Act. The section 6 levy, if made, assured that the
judgment creditor could ultimately collect on his foreign judgment, assuming
its enforceability in this state.18 9
135. Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law
, 
33
Mich. L. Rev. 1129, 1164-65 (1935). See also Note, Registration of Federal Judgments, 42
Iowa L. Rev. 285, 286 (1957).
136. See Restatement of Judgments § 76, comment b (1942).
137. Ill. S.H.A. ch. 77, § 99:
If service by publication or by copy of the petition and summons outside this
State is had, and the judgment debtor fails within thirty days after the return day
fixed in the publication notice or in the summons to act to set aside the registra-
tion or to assert a set-off or counterclaim the registered judgment shall be a final
judgment quasi in rem of the court in which it is registered, binding upon the judg-
ment debtor's interest in property levied upon, and the court shall enter an order to
that effect.
138. Appleton, New York Practice 274 (5th ed., 1957).
139. See 1 Weinstein, Korn & Miller, supra note 104, at ff 314.17.
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Conclusion. This section provides for the logical termination of proceedings
unqer the Act. Its terse reference to the law of the enacting state precludes the
necessity for any changes and, indeed, none of the adopting states have made
any.
§ 14. Interest and Costs.-When a registered judgment becomes a final
judgment of this state, the court shall include as part of the judgment interest
payable on the foreign judgment under the law of the state in which it was
rendered, and the cost of obtaining the authenticated copy of the original
judgment. The court shall include as part of its judgment court costs incidental
to the proceeding in accordance with the law of this state.
Comment. If the judgment is one for the payment of money, it will be en-
forced only in the amount for which it is enforceable in the state of rendition.140
However, costs and other expenses of litigation incurred in the enforcement
proceeding are allowed in accordance with the law of the second state. 141
Since the judgment debtor did not honor the judgment against him in the
state of rendition, or elsewhere, it does not seem unreasonable to require him
specifically to pay for the cost of obtaining the authenticated copy.
Conclusion. If the Act is adopted, there appears to be no reason why section
14 should be altered. If the original judgment does not become a final judgment
of an enacting state, of course, this section would have no application.
§ 15. Satisfaction of Judgment.-Satisfaction, either partial or complete,
of the original judgment or of a judgment entered thereupon in any other state
shall operate to the same extent as satisfaction of the judgment in this state,
except as to costs authorized by section 14.
Comment. Payment or other discharge of a judgment is a defense to its
enforcement elsewhere, but the traditional formulation of the rule states that
the judgment must have been discharged by payment or otherwise under the
law of the rendering state.142 Section 15 does not contain such a provision, but
merely requires that satisfaction wherever made will be the same as satisfaction
in an enacting state.
The effect of presumptions in the rendering state of satisfaction after the
lapse of a certain period of time was discussed in Light v. Light. 43 A Missouri
divorce and alimony decree was registered in Illinois and the judgment debtor
argued that Missouri's conclusive presumption of payment of judgments after
ten years barred enforcement of the judgment in Illinois. However, the supreme
court held that the Missouri statute was not applicable because the judgment
was registered, although not reduced to an Illinois judgment, before the termina-
tion of the ten year period.
Light v. Light also considered the effect of modifiable judgments. The judg-
ment debtor argued that as to periodic alimony payments the Missouri decree
was subject to change in Missouri and was therefore not entitled to full faith
140. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 101 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).-
141. Id., comment c.
142. Id., § 116.
143. 12 Ill. 2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34 (1958).
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and credit. The Illinois court held that as to amounts already accrued, the
judgment was entitled to recognition and enforcement unless subject to retro-
active modification in Missouri. This accords with the prevailing rule that the
constitution does not forbid enforcement in a sister state of a judgment that is
subject to modification in the first state. It is assumed, however, that the second
court would violate due process if it were to enforce the judgment without
affording the judgment debtor an opportunity to litigate the quesion of modifi-
cation. Also, a modifiable judgment will usually be enforced even as to future
installments in a state having the power to require payment by the judgment
debtor as the installments accrue. 144
Conclusion. If the Act is adopted, this section should be included without
change.
Sections 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the Act, respectively, preserve the right of a
judgment creditor to bring an action to enforce his judgment, rather than
proceeding under the Act: provide for uniformity of interpretation; a title; and
repeal of any inconsistent legislation. As to the last, there are no provisions in
New York that are inconsistent with this Act, and since the Act is by its terms
non-exclusive, a repealer is unnecessary.
TENTATIVE CONCLUSION ON ADOPTION OF THE UNIFO~m ENFORCEMeNT
or FoREIGN JUDGMENTS AcT OF 1948
Although the section 3213 motion for summary judgment in lieu of com-
plaint provides an expeditious method for enforcing a foreign judgment (it is
not clear whether it applies only to money judgments), whether extranational
or entitled to full faith and credit, the Act does offer advantages over any of
the provisions of the CPLR as presently in force. Most notable is the right of
the judgment creditor to a levy on property of the debtor within the enacting
state. Another is the provision for in rem jurisdiction and judgment. Although
this method of obtaining satisfaction seems obvious,145 it is not always recog-
nized146 and is seldom, if ever, reflected in the reported cases. Thus even with
the accelerated judgment procedures now available, the Act presents a con-
siderable advance. However, much of it is in the nature of duplication of present
procedures, and it "is not so simple and inexpensive as the federal registration
procedure. It lacks some substantive advantages as well."' 147 Judgment on this
latter point must await examination of the provisions of the Revised 1964 Act
which adopts, in substance, the practice used in the federal courts.148 Yet
another reason for promulgation of the Revised 1964 Act was the widespread
144. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 109 and comment c (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967).
145. Yntema, supra note 135.
146. Paulsen, supra note 107, at 202.
147. Id., at 220.
148. Commissioners' Prefatory Note to Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act (Revised 1964 Act) 9A U.LA. 486, 487 (1965).
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adoption by the states of some form of a regular summary judgment practice,
perhaps epitomized by section 3213 of the CPLR, which made special summary
judgment acts superfluous. 149 Here it is but noted that even if the original
Act is indeed a superfluity, portions of it-especially the provision for levy-
are innovations which deserve incorporation into the existing statutes.
PART IV
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (Revised 1964 Act)
Although the revised Act provides for all judgments entitled to full faith
and credit substantially the same procedure as the federal registration statute
created for district court money judgments, it is considerably longer. Indeed,
the greater detail of the 1964 Act seeks to avoid many of the questions which
have arisen with respect to the federal statute, about which a commentator has
written:
Although there was an undeniable need for some change, it would
appear that this statute is somewhat less than ideal. Primarily, it is
too brief. Unfortunately, in what seems to be a commendable attempt
to achieve simplicity, the framers of the section may have detracted,
from the beneficial effect that it was designed to achieve.150
The burden of his note is devoted to the statute's lack of explicit provision
for defenses capable of barring registration. But there have been other questions
as well, such as those listed by the court of appeals in Stanford v. Utley:151
We note by way of caveat that § 1963 presents much to be
answered in the future. Does the statute's "same effect" language
apply for all purposes and embrace no exception? Does the registra-
tion court have power, under Rule 60, F.R. Civ. P., to correct the
registered judgment? * * * Is a registered judgment itself subject to
registration elsewhere? May a registered judgment be revived by a
later reregistration? Is a registered judgment subject to every attack
which could be raised in an action on that judgment, such as fraud,
lack of jurisdiction, and the like? Is § 1963 the equivalent of the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act even though the
latter is much more detailed in its provisions? Must full faith and
credit be given to a registered judgment? The presence of these and
other questions prompts us to emphasize that the conclusion we reach
here is one having application to the fact situation of this case. We do
not now go so far as to say that registration effects a new judgment
in the registration court for every conceivable purpose; neither do
we say that it fails to do so for any particular purpose. 52
149. Id. at 486.
150. Note, The New Federal Judgment Enforcement Procedure, 50 Colum. L. Rev.
971, 973-74 (1950).
151. 341 F.2d 265, (8th Cir. 1965).
152. Id. at 271.
James Blackstone Mem. Ass'n v. Gulf, Mobile & 0. R.R. Co., 28 F.R.D. 385 (D. Conn.
1961), cited by the court, involved an Illinois federal district court judgment registered under
section 1963 in Connecticut. Execution against the judgment debtor's property had issued.
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Stanford held that a judgment creditor is entitled to enforcement when his
judgment is registered in a sister state within the judgment state's limitation
period, but enforcement is sought later, at a time within the registration state's
limitation period, but after the expiration of the judgment state's.'r 3 For this
purpose, at least, registration is more than a ministerial act, and provides the
equivalent of a new judgment in the registration court:
If registration is to "have the same effect as a judgment," it must, for
our present enforcement purposes, mean just that and not something
else. To restrict registration to a procedural collection device for the
foreign judgment itself, and to have it expire with the foreign judg-
ment would... make registration something far inferior to a judgment
on a judgment.154
The 1964 Act, like the federal statute, provides that a filed (registered)
judgment is to have the same effect as a judgment of the registering state, and
may be enforced in like manner. 155 Thus, it is to be treated as a domestic judg-
ment. It remains to be seen whether the lengthier 1964 Act answers the question
posed by Stanford v. Utley: Whether it is to be treated as a domestic judgment
for all purposes.
§ 1. Definition.-In this Act "foreign judgment" means any judgment,
decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is
entitled to full faith and credit in this state.
Comment. Like the 1948 Act, the accelerated procedure is intended for all
judgments entitled to full faith and credit, whether or not a sum of money is
awarded. 55 The comment on the corresponding section of that Act is, therefore,
relevant here.l. 7 It was there noted that the drafters of the Uniform Foreign
Money-Judgments Recognition Act intend that qualifying foreign money judg-
ments may be enforced by means of the 1948 summary judgment act. They
are silent on the applicability of the 1964 Revision. It was at first thought that
The petitioner asked for relief on the ground that the judgment failed to indicate whether
it was joint or joint and several, and sought a ruling that it be considered merely joint.
The court said, in denying relief:
The threshold question is whether this court has jurisdiction. While 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1963 permits registration of foreign judgments and provides that, upon registra-
tion, the judgment shall have the same effect as a judgment of this court, it does
not follow that this court has full power over this judgment for all purposes and,
more specifically, for the purpose of proceeding under Rule 60. This question has
not been resolved, nor is it necessary to resolve it here, since this motion may be
disposed of on other grounds. Id. at 386.
Cf. Vaughan v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 120 F. Supp. 175 (D. Conn. 1953).
153. Compare Mantanuska Valley Lines Inc. v. Moliter, 365 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1966).
A high proportion of cases arising under the federal statute have presented limitations ques-
tions as to which the statute, like the uniform Acts, makes no provision. See, e.g., Juneau
Spruce Corp. v. I.L.W.U., 128 F. Supp. 715 (NDl. Cal. 1955); Juneau Spruce Corp. v.
I.L.W.U., 128 F. Supp. 697 (D. Hawaii 1955).
154. Stanford v. Utley, 341 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1965).
155. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign judgments Act § 2 (Revised 1964 Act).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1964) applies only to money judgments. See, e.g., Stiller v.
Hardman, 324 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1963).
157. See text accompanying supra notes 64-66.
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foreign country judgments could be enforced (if the 1964 Act were amended to
provide for this) by a registration procedure such as the second enforcement
act provides. Provision is made for notice, so the judgment debtor would have
opportunity to quash the registration proceedings by taking appropriate and
timely measures. Since it would be unlikely that the judgment creditor would
seek registration in a state where neither the judgment debtor nor his property
was present, the probability of the debtor's being unknowingly victimized
seemed low. However, it has been suggested that such a procedure, at least
insofar as it may be made applicable to foreign country judgments, is unduly
burdensome to judgment debtors, especially those against whom default judg-
ments have been entered. Moreover, concern was expressed that the doors
would be opened to highly questionable judgments emanating from highly
questionable legal systems, all the more dangerous because the 1964 Act makes
no provision for judicial, or even quasi-judicial overseeing in the first instance.
Conclusion. In view of these considerations, it is now suggested that no
provision be made in this Act for foreign country judgments. It should be
pointed out, however, that some reasonably speedy enforcement procedure
ought to be made available to foreign country judgments, not only because this
would seem advisable on the merits, but also because lack of such a procedure
has long been a complaint of civil law countries, to the detriment of American
judgments abroad.'58
§ 2. Filing and Status of Foreign Judgments.-A copy of any foreign
judgment authenticated in accordance with the act of Congress or the statutes
of this state may be filed in the office of the Clerk of any [District Court of any
city or county] of this state. The Clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the
same manner as a judgment of the [District Court of any city or county] of this
state. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same pro-
cedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judg-
ment of a [District Court of any city or county] of this state and may be en-
forced or satisfied in like manner.
Comment. The effect and status of the foreign judgment under this pro-
vision are quite different from the 1948 Act. There, registration of the judgment
permits the judgment creditor to obtain a levy upon the judgment debtor's
property and jurisdiction over such property or over the debtor's person. It is
the initial step in the enforcement procedure, and ultimate satisfaction awaits a
new judgment.
Under the 1964 version, filing has the immediate effect of entitling a quali-
fying foreign judgment to the same treatment as a domestic one. The second
state's satisfaction procedures may at once be used by the judgment creditor
unless the debtor is entitled to relief under the last sentence of section 2 or to a
section 4 stay of enforcement.
The Act does not state how the judgment debtor is to present a defense
158. See Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money-Judg-ments Abroad and
What to Do About It, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 236, 259 (1957).
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upon the invalidity of the foreign judgment.1 9 Typically, allowable defenses
to a sister state judgment are limited to lack of jurisdiction or competence in
the first court, certain kinds of fraud, and satisfaction of the judgment. 00 Full
faith and credit for sister state judgments is subject to very few and narrowly
defined exceptions.161 But if a judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit, it
is not a "foreign judgment" as defined by section 1 of the Act and the ac-
celerated procedure would not be available to it. In the absence of a specific
provision, the act must be taken to imply that the burden is upon the judgment
debtor, as to whom provision is made for notice,162 to come forward with any
defenses to the registration itself he may have.0 3
That burden may, and probably should, be lifted a little. Since the judg-
ment creditor registers the properly authenticated foreign judgment in the first
place, it does not seem unduly onerous to require him to provide as well any
subsequent entries affecting it. Section 3 of the original uniform Act requires
him to do so, and Pennsylvania has slightly amended section 2 of the 1964 Act
to include a similar requirement. 6 4 If there has been any satisfaction of the
judgment, for example, and this appears in the records of the first court, the
second court would have available immediate notice of that fact.
The more detailed language of this section does not resolve, for an enacting
state, all of the questions raised by the Stanford court regarding the federal
statute.165 One such question was whether rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure applied to registered judgments. Rule 60(b) relief is obtained by
motion in the court which rendered the judgment. Is it, for example, possible to
make a 60(b) type motion in the registering court without prior recourse to the
159. The lack of provision for defenses capable of barring registration of a federal
judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1964) is discussed in Note, The New Federal Judgment
Enforcement Procedure, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 971 (1950). Compare the British Administratior
of Justice Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 81, summarized in Ynetma, supra note 135, at 1157.
60.
160. See, e.g., listing the defenses in the context of enforcement of judgments, Leflar,
The New Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. 336, 346 (1949); Paulsen, Enforc-
ing the Money Judgment of a Sister State, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 202, 204 (1957) (lack of juris-
diction, lack of finality, the running of the statute of limitations, and payment or discharge
in bankruptcy. Fraud in obtaining the judgment is included because it is a ground for at-
tacking a local judgment in every state. Note, The New Federal Judgment Enforcement
Procedure, supra note 159, at 974. See generally Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
Ch. 5 (Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
161. See generally Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments,
49 Colum. L. Rev. 153 (1949); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 103 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1967).
162. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act § 3 (Revised 1964 Act).
163. The federal statute has been criticized on the ground that the only manner in
which registration of an invalid judgment can be prevented is by a separate action to enjoin
registration. Note, The New Federal Judgment Enforcement Procedure, supra note 159 at
976-77. Moreover, it makes no specific provision for notice.
The British Foreign Judgments [Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933, 23 & 24 Geo.
5, c. 13, § 4, states that on application duly made by a party against whom a registered
judgment may be enforced, registration shall be set aside on any of the listed grounds, if
present.
164. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 12 Pa. Stat. § 22 (1965).
165. See text accompanying supra note 152.
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original court, or must relief initially be sought in the first court? 166 It has been
suggested that within a policy of facilitating judgment enforcement, 167 a register-
ing court ought to have the power to determine matters germane to registration
and enforcement when appropriately raised, such as whether the judgment is
registrable or is dormant in the first state. In general, the registering court
should have the power to grant 60(b) type relief when the rendering court is no
more familiar with the situation than the registering court, although it may not
determine whether the first court made a correct adjudication. Thus, if the
issued raised by a 60(b) type motion could be raised in an independent action
to enjoin enforcement, it can be disposed of on the motion. And the "judgment
creditor can hardly contend that the court of registration is an inconvenient
forum for disposition of a 60(b) motion . *... 168 Similarly, if the defense is
one which could be made in an action on a foreign judgment, the same result
should follow where the judgment creditor registers the judgment and the debtor
moves to have it vacated, for example, as void under 60(b) (4).169 There may,
however, be circumstances in which only the rendering court should dispose of
a 60(b) type motion, as where relief is sought on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence. The first court, because of its familiarity with the proceedings,
and often the participants, is the preferable forum.
If the 1964 Act is adopted in New York, an analogous problem is presented.
The question is again whether "the same effect" language of section 2 means
the same effect for all purposes. The 1964 Act elaborates, as the federal statute
does not, that the registered judgment is subject to the same defenses and pro-
cedures as a judgment of a court of an enacting state. In other words, it is to be
treated as if it had been sued upon and reduced to a domestic judgment. How-
ever, this may not always be desirable or feasible. Like federal rule 60(b), 5015
of the CPLR creates a form of relief that may be had by a motion in the court
which rendered the judgment. In the case of a registered sister state judgment,
the effect of the full faith and credit clause is relevant. The "local law of the
state of rendition will be applied to determine whether equitable relief can be
obtained against the judgment. On the other hand, the local law of the state
where recognition or enforcement . . . is sought determines the procedure for
obtaining such relief.' 170 It would seem that the party opposing enforcement on
166. Compare James Blackstone Mem. Ass'n. v. Gulf Mobile & Ohio R.R., Co., 28
F.R.D. 385 (D. Conn. 1961), discussed at supra note 152, with Hadden v. Rumsey Products,
196 F.2d 92 (2nd Cir. 1952), in which the judgment creditor registered, under U.S.C. § 1963,
a judgment by confession on a cognovit note. The debtor instituted, in the registering court,
a proceeding to enjoin enforcement on the ground of fraud and duress in procuring execu-
tion of the note. This was treated as an independent action in equity which need not be
brought in the rendering court, so it was not necessary to reach a rule 60(b) question.
167. The following discussion is digested from 7 Moore, Federal Practice ff 60.28[l)
(1955).
168. Id.
169. Rule 60(b) (4), F.R.C.P., provides for relief on the ground that the judgment
is void.
170. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 115, comment b (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967). A judgment will not be enforced in a second state where equitable relief could
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such a ground has the burden of establishing in the second state that the relief
he asks could be obtained in the state of rendition.' 7' The question would then
be whether such relief can appropriately be given by the second court.
Although the initial question is similar to that posed by rule 60(b), differ-
ent factors are involved, because the courts of the various states, unlike the
federal district courts, are governed by many different procedural systems. It
would not seem advisable to attempt to draft a statute in terms that would
anticipate all of the possible questions that might arise under the full faith and
credit clause, or even under general conflict of laws principles. Application of
the Act's provisions in specific instances can perhaps best be left to judicial in-
terpretation. Like its federal counterpart, however, it should be read in the
context of its underlying purpose: to facilitate the policies that the full faith
and credit clause was designed to effectuate. 7 2
Although many areas are still unclear, section 2 does provide important
improvements over the federal model. It specifies, as the prototype does not, the
availability of defenses and the procedures by which they are presented. Unless
the judgment debtor takes steps to prevent it, enforcement will follow as a
matter of course after registration. The process is simpler and faster than that
of the 1948 version.
Conclusion. The "same effect as a judgment of the . . . court ...where
registered" language of the federal statute is echoed in the 1964 Act. Although
section 2 is more explicit in its terms, it carries a similar penumbra of uncer-
tainty, notwithstanding the addition of the provision that a filed judgment is
"subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, va-
cating, or staying as a judgment ...of this state." The answer may well be,
be obtained against it in the state of rendition, except where such relief could have been
obtained only in the original proceeding itself. Id. at comment a. See Paulsen, supra note 160,
at 205-206, for an examination of the question whether grounds for reexamination in the
first state are in all cases available in an action on the judgment in a second state.
It is possible to construe section 2 so as to avoid the rule 5015 problem just discussed,
although the interpretation may be a bit tenuous, resting as it does upon the use of articles.
When referring to the clerk's treatment of the foreign judgment upon filing, section 2 requires
that he treat it as a judgment of the district court, presumably the one in which it is filed.
When speaking of the status of the foreign judgment, the section states that it has the same
effect and is subject to the same procedures as a judgment of a district court, possibly mean-
ing some court other than that in which it is filed. A 5015 motion can be made only in the
court which rendered the judgment.
171. Restatement (Second), supra note 170. Defenses that could have been raised in
the original proceeding are, however, thereafter foreclosed. See authorities cited supra notes
160-61 and accompanying text. Any question concerning rule 5015 will probably be limited
to those grounds which are not available in an action on a sister state judgment. As to the
others, the only question would be whether the motion is the appropriate procedure. This is
a question distinctly within the competence of the second state.
172. Speaking of the British registration statutes, and comparing the practice created
by them with prevailing American methods, Professor Yntema described the latter as "a
somewhat singular phenomenon of retarded legal development. . . .The situation in the
United States is not less singular in that the Full Faith and Credit Clause, literally con-
strued, appears to invite a construction which the more practically minded British genius
has now apparently achieved without such suggestion." The Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1129, 1165 (1935).
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however, that once a foreign judgment is sued upon in a second state, and
reduced to a domestic judgment through the traditional method, the same or
similar problems can arise when relief is thereafter sought.
If this Act should be adopted, the only suggested change is one requiring
the judgment creditor to provide any subsequent entries in the court of rendi-
tion affecting the judgment he wishes to register.
§ 3. Notice of Filing.-(a) At the time of the filing of the foreign judg-
ment, the judgment creditor or his lawyer shall make and file with the Clerk of
Court an affidavit setting forth the name and the last known post office address
of the judgment debtor, and the judgment creditor.
(b) Promptly upon the filing of the foreign judgment and the affidavit, the
Clerk shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to the judgment
debtor at the address given and shall make a note of the mailing in the docket.
The notice shall include the name and post office address of the judgment
creditor and the judgment creditor's lawyer, if any, in this state. In addition, the
judgment creditor may mail by certified mail a notice of the filing of the judg-
ment to the judgment debtor and may file proof of mailing with the Clerk. Lack
of mailing notice of filing by the Clerk shall not affect the enforcement proceed-
ings if proof of mailing by the judgment creditor has been filed.
[ (c) No execution or other process for enforcement of a foreign judgment
filed hereunder shall issue until [ ] days after the date the judgment is
filed.]
Comment. This provision details the procedure to be followed for notifying
the judgment debtor. The federal registration statute is silent on both notice
to and defenses of the judgment debtor except that it provides for registration
by him of any satisfaction. Both statutes, however, eliminate the necessity of
obtaining jurisdiction over the judgment debtor or his property. The notice
of filing serves only to alert him to what is being done with the judgment
rendered against him.
The elimination of jurisdiction has been explained on the ground that
registration is, for this purpose at least, a "ministerial act" rather than a pro-
ceeding. 178 Other descriptive phrases have been employed, often depending upon
the object of the suit in which they are used.174 However registration is charac-
terized, obstacles to enforcement are not, it is said, "a part of the judgment and
do not affect the rights of the litigants as determined thereby. Nor do rules
which remove such obstacles vary the terms of the judgment. They only facili-
tate its use. They are clearly procedural."'1 75
Calling registration something other than a proceeding does not really
answer serious questions raised by notification which does not result in jurisdic-
tion for purposes of judgment enforcement. The questions have, however, been
examined and the resulting answers have been deemed to support the constitu-
173. Gullet v. Gullet, 188 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1951); but see Stanford v. Utley, 341
F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1965).
174. See authorities cited in Stanford v. Utley, 341 F.2d at 270 for characterizations
of the effect of a section 1963 registration.
175. 2 Moore, Federal Practice 13 1.04 (1966).
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tionality of a registration statute.176 The Commissioners' views and a summary
of their conclusions on the due process aspects of a registration procedure have
been summarized earlier.177 Here they will be expanded somewhat with direct
reference to the statute at hand.
Procedural due process has not been interpreted as requiring more than
notice and one complete and final hearing before a competent tribunal.178 The
judgment debtor has had such a hearing in the first state and the full faith and
credit clause prevents him from raising in a sister state any defenses that are
foreclosed in the rendering state.179 Under section 1, the Act applies only to
judgments entitled to full faith and credit so it is implicit in the Act that other
judgments cannot be registered and that the judgment debtor can challenge
registration on the ground the judgment against him is not entitled to recogni-
tion. 80
Substantive due process implies the necessity of acquiring jurisdiction over
a party prior to affecting his property. An early Supreme Court case had de-
clared that a judgment was without force in a sister state until reduced to a new
judgment there.' 8 ' This and subsequent pronouncements caused the draftsmen
of the 1948 Act to reject a registration statute at that time, not because they
believed such an Act would be struck down on the basis of such statements, but
because state legislators might have doubts militating against adoption.8 2
The damaging pronouncements in the Supreme Court opinions have been
characterized as dicta, at least on the due process point.'83 Insofar as full faith
and credit is concerned, they are considered as doing no more than stating the
minimal requirements of the constitutional clause,' 8 4 rather than announcing
limits beyond which the states may not go.
176. Leflar, supra note 160, at 347-49; Note, The Constitutionality of a Uniform Recip-
rocal Registration of Judgments Statute, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 488 (1961).
177. See text accompanying supra notes 54-57.
178. Leflar, supra note 160, at 346. See, e.g., Standard Oil Company v. Missouri ex rel.
Hadley, 224 U.S. 270, 286-87 (1912), stating that a right of appeal is not essential to due
process of law. Subject to the requirements of notice and opportunity for a hearing, state
laws regulating procedure, evidence and methods of trial have generally been upheld.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908).
179. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236 (1908).
180. Lack of jurisdiction of the judgment-rendering court is clearly such a ground.
This does not constitute an exception to full faith and credit, but prevents its effect al-
together, since the judgment is void in the first state. See Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full
Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 153, 170 (1949).
181. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 311, 324-25 (U.S. 1839); Reese & Johnson, supra
note 175, at 155; Note, The Constitutionality of a Uniform Reciprocal Registration of
Judgments Statute, supra note 171, at 491.
182. See text accompanying supra note 54.
183. Leflar, supra note 160, at 348.
184. Note, The Constitutionality of a Uniform Reciprocal Registration of Judgments
Statute, supra note 176, at 492.
That it is necessary to reduce a foreign judgment to a domestic one before execution
can issue was clearly stated by J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws 1005
(3d ed. 1846). This position is based upon the principle of territoriality, of late increasingly
criticized. See, e.g., Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American
Law, 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1129 (1935).
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"Due process requires that the court which assumes to determine the rights
of the parties shall have jurisdiction,"'81 5 but in the cases to which the uniform
Act would apply, the rights of the parties will already have been determined.
The only question is how to give effect to that determination. "It seems more
appropriate, then, for due process purposes, to liken registration to an execution
proceeding initiated after judgment."'1 86 Such proceedings do not require new
service.'87
Nor does due process require a judicial proceeding in every case:
To learn what the procedure must be in a particular situation, in order
to constitute due process, we turn necessarily to the decisions of our
Court. These [decisions] tell us that due process does not require that a
decision made by an appropriate tribunal shall be reviewable by
another. *** They tell us that due process is not necessarily judicial
process. And they draw distinctions . . . when due process re-
quires judicial process and when it does not.
The first distinction is between issues of law and issues of fact.
When dealing with the constitutional rights . . . there must be the
opportunity of presenting in an appropriate proceeding, at some time,
to some court, every question of law raised .... The second distinc-
tion is between the right to liberty of person and other constitutional
rights. * * * But a multitude of decisions tells us that when dealing
with property a much more liberal rule applies. They show that due
process of law does not always entitle an owner to have the correctness
of findings of fact reviewed by a court ... .188
In the particular situation with which the registration statute is concerned, the
judgment debtor has had his day in court, and any further defenses are nar-
rowly circumscribed by the full faith and credit clause.189 Thus the opinion of
the drafters that the registration Act could withstand a constitutional attack on
due process grounds seems well founded.
There remains the objection that a judgment is only a judgment in the state
of rendition, and is merely a cause of action elsewhere. 190 But there is nothing
to prevent a second state from adopting by its own authority the act of the first
court without a new action on the judgment. 191 The federal district courts do
this under the federal registration statute, and there is longstanding precedent
for such a practice in other common law countries.' 92
185. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908).
186. Note, The Constitutionality of a Uniform Reciprocal Registration of Judgments
Statute, supra note 176, at 492.
187. Id. and authorities there cited. See also, e.g., Robinson v. Robinson, 24 A.D.2d
138, 264 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1965).
188. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 76-77 (1936).
189. See authorities cited supra note 161.
190. See Story, supra note 184; Leflar, supra note 155, at 348; Yntema, supra note
184, at 1149, 1164-65.
191. Note, The Constitutionality of a Uniform Reciprocal Registration of Judgments
Statute, supra note 176, at 493. See alto Yntema, supra note 184, at 1166, emphasizing the
character of a foreign judgment as a judgment.
192. On the various statutes of the countries of the British Commonwealth, see, e.g.,
Yntema, supra note 184, at 1150-58. A more recent, and very brief, summary is found in
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Mailing of notice under this Act, then, is not a jurisdictional act. It there-
fore is not relevant to reconcile this provision with the CPLR. It is only noted
that if the judgment creditor elects to mail notice himself, use of certified or
registered mail would be prudent since he must file proof of mailing with the
clerk. The requirement that notice be promptly sent diminishes the possibility
of any such unknown detriment to the judgment debtor as may result from the
federal act's lack of any notice provision.193 The method chosen by the drafters
has, of course, been held to be a reasonable means of notification for due process
purposes. 94
Implicit in the section is that unless notice has been mailed to the judgment
debtor (who need not actually receive it)' 95 the creditor may not proceed to
enforcement. Such a construction seems necessary if the judgment debtor is to
have a fair opportunity to present any defenses he has.
Concern as to the adequacy of the notice section has been expressed by
many of those who commented on the Act. A particularly troublesome situation
seems to be the case in which the judgment debtor suffered a default judgment
in the first instance, possibly because he was a victim of a "sewer service" in the
first state. Objection has also been made on the ground that the registering judg-
ment creditor might accidentally or purposely falsify the address of the judgment
debtor in the section 3 affidavit.' 96
It is believed that none of these objections are insoluble, as long as it is
recognized that solutions will necessarily cut down on the efficiency of the pro-
cess provided by the Act. For example, the judgment creditor could be required
to file a bond where the judgment registered was obtained by default. Or it may
be possible to provide for judicial supervision for default judgments, or indeed,
to exclude default judgments altogether from the scope of the Act. Such a course,
however, would obviously eliminate from its scope many, if not most of the judg-
ments sought to be enforced. Registered mail, return receipt requested could be
required in all cases, with possibly the creditor posting a bond when the receipt
is not returned. Another partial solution would be to include the optional sub-
Note, The New Federal Judgment Enforcement Procedure, 50 Colum. L. Rev. 971-72
(1950).
The exequatur of the civil law is a writ which renders a foreign judgment executory
without the necessity of a new judgment. See Katz & Brewster, Cases in International Trans-
actions and Relations 442 (1960); Delaume, American-French Private International Law
160 (2d ed. 1961).
193. Compare Note, The New Federal Judgment Enforcement Procedure, supra note
192, at 977.
194. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 25, comment d (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967).
195. Id. and comment e.
196. These doubts were also expressed during deliberations on the drafting of the Act.
See, e.g., Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act 36-37 (Aug. 9, 1963). The possibility of a falsified address-or simply a
changed one-led to the introduction of the requirement of an affidavit, missing from an
earlier draft of section 3. Id. at 37; Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, Revised Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 3 (Aug. 5, 1964).
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section (c) in section 3 which provides for delay of execution until a stated
period of time after filing.
Subsection (c) protects the judgment debtor during the interval between
filing and receipt of notice. In the absence of any specific provision for notice
to a judgment debtor prior to execution in enforcement of a money judgment
under CPLR Article 52, incorporation of subsection (c) would afford a measure
of security to the debtor who may not anticipate the foreign execution as would
a debtor on a domestic judgment. It would also give a debtor time to remove
his property should he become aware of the registration. A tolerable compromise
might be to borrow the immediate levy provision from section 6 of the 1948
Act, while delaying only the time for sale.
Conclusion. Many of the problems considered here found expression in
the Proceedings in Committee of the Whole during deliberations on the Re-
vised 1964 Act.197 The resolution was thought not to be determined solely by
the case of the small debtor harrassed in justice court proceedings; the interests
of the creditor who had litigated his claim to successful conclusion ought also
be preserved. The possibility of abuse was conceded, but on the basis of the fed-
eral experience, was not the probability.198
The only real problem seems to be where the judgment debtor did not ap-
pear in the first proceeding. Whether such a defendant had actually received
notice may be unknown. Similar difficulty is inherent in confession judgments.
Here, additional safeguards may be desirable to assure him of actual knowledge
of the registration, and if this is impossible, then to safeguard his interests by
requiring extra time before execution, or possibly requiring a bond from the
judgment creditor.
§ 4. Stay.-(a) If the judgment debtor shows the [District Court of any
city or country] that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will be
taken, or that a stay of execution has been granted, the court shall stay enforce-
ment of the foreign judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal
expires, or the stay of execution expires or is vacated, upon proof that the judg-
ment debtor has furnished the security for the satisfaction of the judgment re-
quired by the state in which it was rendered.
(b) If the judgment debtor shows the [District Court of any city or coun-
try] any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of any [District Court
of any city or country] of this state would be stayed, the court shall stay en-
forcement of the foreign judgment for an appropriate period, upon requiring the
same security for satisfaction of the judgment which is required in this state.
Comment. This section assures that the judgment debtor will be able to
present any grounds for a stay of execution that he may have. It does not pro-
vide for the effect, if any, to be given a stay of execution granted in a second
registering state.
Subsection (a) requires a result consistent with, but not required by, the
197. See, e.g., discussion in supra note 196.
198. Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
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full faith and credit clause. If appellate proceedings in the first state do not
vacate the judgment, suit to enforce it may be brought in another state. Al-
though not required to do so, the second state will generally stay judgment or
execution pending determination of the appeal.9 9 But since an appealed judg-
ment may be accorded full faith and credit, it would not be precluded from
registration by the section 1 definition of foreign judgments2 00 The mandatory
stay under section 4(a) will avoid the embarrassing possibility of a judgment
reversed in one state after having been enforced in another.
Subsection (b) requires a stay of enforcement in circumstances where a
domestic judgment would be stayed.
The wording of section 4 indicates that the judgment debtor must take
some action before the court is required to order a stay. Even if section 2 is
amended as suggested to require that subsequent entries affecting the judgment
be included by the judgment creditor in the registration in this state, the judg-
ment debtor would have to take the initiative, since a second court is not re-
quired to issue a stay.
Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Act provide for such matters as fees,
preservation of alternative forms of enforcement, uniformity of interpretation,
a title, repeal of any inconsistent legislation, and a time for taking effect.
PART V
Conclusions
Except in the area of judgment enforcement, state boundaries impose no
substantial obstacles to convenient and expeditious commerce. Since there is no
real justification for this state of affairs, it would seem that the issue is not
whether to improve it, but how.
The two uniform Acts which have been the subject of this report offer al-
ternative methods. The summary judgment procedure of the 1948 Act offers
some innovations, based upon a summary judgment practice that has been well
established in many states, including New York. The 1964 Revision is a clear
departure from traditional methods, although on the federal level there has
been considerable experience with the registration device.
The availability in New York of summary judgment procedures applicable
to foreign judgments raises questions as to the extent of the improvement the
1948 Act would provide. Its advantages over current practice-the judgment
creditor's right of levy at any time after registration, for example-are consider-
able, but in some respects it merely continues some of the disadvantages. The
most important of these is the necessity of obtaining jurisdiction over the judg-
ment debtor. The case law seems poised at the point of making important pro-
judgments Act 25-28 (Aug. 9, 1963).
199. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 112, comment b (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967).
200. Id.
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gress in this regard, but it is uncertain how far it will be developed. Quasi in
rem jurisdiction, specifically provided for in the Act, has probably been available
in this state, but there is little indication of the extent of its use. The Act, how-
ever, clearly authorizes it.
Beyond this, the first Act cannot be said to depart significantly from present
summary judgment motion practice, especially the accelerated one of CPLR sec-
tion 3213. However, it must be added that from the viewpoint of foreign coun-
tries, its enactment may be much more significant than the actual improvements
it makes would seem to warrant. It has been noted that the absence of a clearly
delineated enforcement procedure has been a cause for complaint abroad, and
has probably worked to the detriment of American judgments when their en-
forcement was sought there.201 From the viewpoint of the judgment creditor, it
may be asked whether the Act creates a significantly faster process than those
he uses now. From the viewpoint of the courts, it may be asked whether the
summary judgment procedure noticeably lightens their burden.
If the 1948 Act is preferred over its successor, the question arises whether
to retain it in its present form or to incorporate it into the relevant sections of
the CPLR, perhaps deleting some of its provisions in favor of existing ones.
Certainly the right to immediate levy should be retained if this course is fol-
lowed.
Clearly, however, the 1964 Act is a faster, more efficient, less expensive
enforcement method than its predecessor, and this is true from the viewpoint
of all concerned. Its acceptance is hampered primarily by traditional notions
of the effective range of judgments and, more importantly, by due process.
The Act, however, is scrupulously fair to the judgment debtor who is pro-
vided with notice and an opportunity to be heard; the burden is then upon
him to halt the proceedings.
In all likelihood, if the 1964 Act is adopted, questions will arise, especially
with respect to "the same effect" language of section 2, which have not been
foreseen here. It can only be said that this is probably an inevitable effect of
new legislation whose interpretation and construction in specific instances can
best be left to the courts. The registration procedure does, however, seem most
adequately to realize the policies sought to be effectuated by the full faith and
credit clause. It would be of significant advantage to both judgment creditors
and courts. The only detriment to the judgment debtor who was properly
within the jurisdiction of the first court is the loss of opportunity to delay or
avoid altogether satisfaction of the judgment against him. As to debtors on
invalid judgments, especially those who had not been properly notified of the
first proceeding, some special safeguards ought to be incorporated.
Some legislation ought to be provided for foreign country judgments.
Some difficulty may arise insofar as many civilians may be sensitive to in-
201. See Nadelmann, suspra note 158.
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equality of treatment for foreign and domestic judgments. To the extent that
one purpose of any improvement in this area is to secure reciprocal improve-
ment for enforcement of American judgments abroad, such inequality may
defeat that purpose.
APPENDIX
UNIFOPm ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT
1948 Act
§ 1. Definitions.-As used in this Act
(a) "Foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree or order of a court
of the United States or of any State or Territory which is entitled to full faith
and credit in this state.
(b) "Register" means to [file and] [docket and] [record] a foreign judg-
ment in a court of this state.
(c) "Levy" means to take control of or create a lien upon property under
any judicial writ or process whereby satisfaction of a judgment may be en-
forced against such property.
(d) "Judgment debtor" means the party against whom a foreign judg-
ment has been rendered.
§ 2. Registration of Judgment.-On application made within the time
allowed for bringing an action on a foreign judgment in this state, any person
entitled to bring such action may have a foreign judgment registered in any
court of this state having jurisdiction of such an action.
§ 3. Application for Registration,-A [verified] [petition] for registration
shall set forth a copy of the judgment to be registered, the date of its entry
and the record of any subsequent entries affecting it [such as levies of execu-
tion, payments in partial satisfaction and the like] all authenticated in the
manner authorized by the laws of the United States or of this state, and a
prayer that the judgment be registered. The Clerk of the registering court shall
notify the clerk of the Court which rendered the original judgment that appli-
cation for registration has been made, and shall request him to file this in-
formation with the judgment.§ 4. Personal Jurisdiction.-At any time after registration the [petitioner]
shall be entitled to have [summons] [issued and] served upon the judgment
debtor as in an action brought upon the foreign judgment, in any manner au-
thorized by the law of this state for obtaining jurisdiction of the person.
§ 5. Notice in Absence of Personal Jurisdiction.-If jurisdiction of the
person of the judgment debtor cannot be obtained, a [notice] [summons]
clearly designating the foreign judgment and reciting the fact of registration,
the court in which it is registered, and the time allowed for pleading, shall be
sent by the Clerk of the registering court by registered mail to the last known
address of the judgment debtor. Proof of such mailing shall be made by certif-
icate of the Clerk.
§ 6. Levy.--At any time after registration and regardless of whether juris-
diction of the person of the judgment debtor has been secured or final judgment
has been obtained, a levy may be made under the registered judgment upon
any property of the judgment debtor which is subject to execution or other
judicial process for satisfaction of judgments.
§ 7. New Personal Judgment.-If the judgment debtor fails to plead
within [sixty days] after jurisdiction over his person has been obtained, or if
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the court after hearing has refused to set the registration aside, the registered
judgment shall become a final personal judgment of the court in which it is
registered.
§ 8. Defenses.-Any defense [set-off] [counter-claim] [or cross com-
plaint] which under the law of this state may be asserted by the defendant in
an action on the foreign judgment may be presented by appropriate pleadings
and the issues raised thereby shall be tried and determined as in other civil
actions. Such pleadings must be filed within [sixty days] after personal juris-
diction is acquired over him or within [sixty days] after the mailing of the
notice prescribed in section 5.
§ 9. Pendency of Appeal.--If the judgment debtor shows that an appeal
from the original judgment is pending or that he is entitled and intends to ap-
peal therefrom, the court shall, on such terms as it thinks just, postpone the
trial for such time as appears sufficient for the appeal to be concluded, and
may set aside the levy upon proof that the defendant has furnished adequate
security for satisfaction of the judgment.
§ 10. Effect of Setting Aside Registration.-An order setting aside a regis-
tration constitutes a final [judgment] in favor of the judgment debtor.
§ 11. Appeal.-An appeal may be taken by either party from any [judg-
ment] [order] [or decision] sustaining or setting aside-a registration on the
same terms as an appeal for a [judgment] [order] [or decision] of the same
court.
§ 12. New Judgment Quasi in Rem.-If personal jurisdiction of the judg-
ment debtor is not secured within [sixty days] after the levy and he has not,
within [sixty days] after the mailing of the notice prescribed by section 5,
acted to set aside the registration [or to assert a set-off] [counter-claim] [or
cross-complaint] the registered judgment shall be a final judgment quasi in
rem of the court in which it is registered, binding upon the judgment debtor's
interest in property levied upon, and the court shall enter an order to that
effect.
§ 13. Sale under Levy.-Sale under the levy may be held at any time after
final judgment, either personal or quasi in rem, but not earlier except as other-
wise provided by law for sale under levy on perishable goods. Sale and distri-
bution of the proceeds shall be made in accordance with the law of this state.
§ 14. Interest and Costs.--When a registered foreign judgment becomes a
final judgment of this state, the court shall include as part of the judgment inter-
est payable on the foreign judgment under the law of the state in which it was
rendered, and the cost of obtaining the authenticated copy of the original judg-
ment. The court shall include as part of its judgment court costs incidental to
the proceeding in accordance with the law of this state.
§ 15. Satisfaction of Judgment.-Satisfaction, either partial or complete, of
the original judgment or of a judgment entered thereupon in any other state
shall operate to the same extent as satisfaction of the judgment in this state, ex-
cept as to costs authorized by section 14.
§ 16. Optional Procedure.--The right of a judgment creditor to bring an
action to enforce his judgment instead of proceeding under this Act remains
unimpaired.
§ 17. Uniformity of Interpretation.-This act shall be so interpreted and
construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it.
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§ 18. Short Title.-This act may be cited as the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act.§ 19. Repeal-All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the pro-
visions of this act are hereby repealed.
UNIFO ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT
(Revised 1964 Act)
§ 1. Definition.-In this Act "foreign judgment" means any judgment,
decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is
entitled to full faith and credit in this state.§ 2. Filing and Status of Foreign Judgments.-A copy of any foreign judg-
ment authenticated in accordance with the act of Congress or the statutes of this
state may be filed in the office of the Clerk of any [District Court of any city or
county] of this state. The Clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same
manner as a judgment of the [District Court of any city or county] of this state.
A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures,
defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a
[District Court of any city or county] of this state and may be enforced or
satisfied in like manner.
§ 3. Notice of Filing.-(a) At the time of the filing of the foreign judg-
ment, the judgment creditor or his lawyer shall make and file with the Clerk
of Court an affidavit setting forth the name and last known post office address
of the judgment debtor, and the judgment creditor.
(b) Promptly upon the filing of the foreign judgment and the affidavit, the
Clerk shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to the judgment debtor
at the address given and shall make a note of the mailing in the docket. The
notice shall include the name and post office address of the judgment creditor
and the judgment creditor's lawyer, if any, in this state. In addition, the judg-
ment creditor may mail a notice of the filing of the judgment to the judgment
debtor and may file proof of mailing with the Clerk. Lack of mailing notice of
filing by the Clerk shall not affect the enforcement proceedings if proof of mail-
ing by the judgment.creditor has been filed.
[ (c) No execution or other process for enforcement of a foreign judgment
filed hereunder shall issue until [ ] days after the date of the judgment is
filed.]
§ 4. Stay.-(a) If the judgment debtor shows the [District Court of any
city or county] that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will be
taken, or that a stay of execution has been granted, the court shall stay enforce-
ment of the foreign judgment until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal
expires, or the stay of execution expires or is vacated, upon proof that the judg-
ment debtor has furnished the security for the satisfaction of the judgment re-
quired by the state in which it was rendered.
(b) If the judgment debtor shows the [District Court of any city or
county] any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of any [district
Court of any city or county] of this state would be stayed, the court shall stay
enforcement of the foreign judgment for an appropriate period, upon requiring
the same security for satisfaction of the judgment which is required in this state.
§ 5. Fees.-Any person filing a foreign judgment shall pay to the Clerk of
Court dollars. Fees for docketing, transcription or other enforce-
ment proceedings shall be as provided for judgments of the [District Court of
any city or county of this state].
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§ 6. Optional Procedure.-The right of a judgment creditor to bring an
action to enforce his judgment instead of proceeding under this Act remains
unimpaired.
§ 7. Uniformity of Interpretation.-This Act shall be so interpreted and
construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it.
§ 8. Short Title.-This Act may be cited as the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act.
§ 9. Repeal.-The following Acts and parts of Acts are repealed:
(1)(2)
(3)§ 10. Taking Effect.-This Act takes effect as of

